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AP { December 23, 2007
The New York Yankees today signed multi-millionaire shortstop Tommy
Hussein to a one year, $35 million contract. This is by far the largest sum ever
paid a professional athlete for one year's work.
Asked why he would invest such a large sum in a single player for such a short
time, ailing Yankee owner George Steinbrenner, 77, said that Hussein's popular-
ity throughout the United States, especially, though not exclusively, with kids,
justied the salary. \People will pay at least $75 a ticket to see this guy play,"
mused the veteran Yankee owner. \With cable and satellite TV as prevalent
as they are," he continued, every Yankee game this season will be broadcast
1nationwide. There's money in that. The investment will surely create a signi-
cant return. Meanwhile," Steinbrenner added, \this will be great for New York.
Not since the '96 series has this town had anything to be excited about. This
will surely liven things up." Steinbrenner was uncharacteristically vague in his
response when asked why he had not gotten Hussein to sign a longer contract.
\He's got plans," Steinbrenner said. \We'll take what we can get."
Hussein was no more specic about his reasons for making such a
short commitment. The wildly popular athlete, and sometime actor and polit-
ical commentator said simply, \I want to have my options open." As for the
salary, Hussein, 34, admitted that it would simply pad his already-hefty coers,
but noted, \Hey, this is the kind of thing that made America great. Supply and
demand. I'm in demand, and there's only one of me to supply. I'll take what I
can get."
Americans polled on their opinion of the contract split almost down
the middle. Nearly half expressed outrage, or at least disdain for Steinbrenner
and Hussein. \When did the great American pastime become a commodity?"
asked one. \Nobody deserves $200,000 for one night's work," griped another,
referring to Hussein's estimated per-game salary. \Nobody." Barely a majority
of those polled, however, approved of the contract, expressing deep admiration
for Tommy Hussein. \The guy's the consummate role model," one participant
claimed. \He's athletic, good-looking, extremely intelligent, a great actor, and
an insightful political theorist. To have a guy like that playing professional
baseball and serving as an inspiration to today's young people is worth every
2penny I have to pay to see a baseball game. It's a sharp contrast to the drug
addicts and perverts who dominated professional sports in the 80s and 90s."
Asked to respond to charges that paying this kind of money to pro-
fessional athletes was unfair to the American public, which just wants to enjoy
the game of baseball at reasonable prices, Hussein reiterated the economic the-
ory for which he is nearly as famous as his baseball skills. \Yes, the money's
going into my pocket initially," he said, \but with me on the baseball eld, the
economy will thrive. Higher priced hot dogs at the ball park and higher priced
ads during the televised games means more income for hot dog vendors and TV
stations, means higher wages. It gets the economy moving. It will simply be
good for America."
AP { April 9, 2008
At a press conference earlier today, Iraqi-American multi-millionaire
New York Yankee shortstop, Tommy Hussein made the utterly astonishing
announcement that he intends to run for President of the United States this
November, as an independent candidate. Hussein, although no stranger to po-
litical controversy, shocked the country today when he announced that he plans
to campaign throughout the baseball season and to leave the sport for Wash-
ington by next January, assuming he is victorious.
Announcing simply, \The key to America's success lies in making a
success of the country's businesses. I will make sure American business suc-
ceeds," Hussein, who will be 35 next month, declared his ocial candidacy,
without elaborating further on his platform.
3Reaction from the Richards and Quayle campaigns were swift. \Ev-
erybody loves Tommy Hussein," said the ex-governor of Texas, who has nearly
locked up the democratic nomination. \But his political ideas are just crackers.
I don't consider him serious competition." Richards is seeking to create two
milestones, by becoming both the rst woman and the oldest person to serve as
President of the United States. Meanwhile, former Vice President Quayle is also
extremely negative towards the Hussein candidacy. \We've endured 16 years of
liberalism run amok in this country," he charged, \but Hussein's oddball ideas
about support for business and neglect for everyone and everything else is just
going too far. I think the good and honest people of these United States will
quickly recognize that."
But Quayle and Richards may be in for more of a battle than they
have anticipated. Not since billionaire H. Ross Perot attempted to buy his way
into the White House in 1992 and 1996 has such a monied candidate sought
the presidency. While Hussein may not be quite as wealthy as was Perot, he
may in fact have more capacity to exploit his power due to his popularity as a
professional athlete. There has also already been speculation on how Hussein's
ownership of the Coca-Cola company, the stock of which he and a handful of
his friends now control, may assist his candidacy.
AP { April 29, 2008
President Gore came to the oval oce this morning to nd an odd
present left by one of his staers { a single can of Coca-Cola. The President
later told White House reporters he was astonished to nd the smiling face of
4Tommy Hussein, majority stockholder of the Coca-Cola Company and recently-
declared presidential candidate, plastered on the can where for years had resided
a representation of the uniquely-shaped bottle in which Coke had been sold dur-
ing his childhood. In letters patterned with the American ag, the President
read the words, \Money and power for big business. Good for America. Good
for you. Tommy for President." The President's staers informed him that they
had already called the Coca-Cola Company, to nd that the message had been
printed on every bottle and can of Coke now being marketed in the country.
The staers were also informed that the Coca-Cola company was donating ap-
proximately 25% of its prots earned between now and the November 4 election
to the Hussein campaign.
Outraged, President Gore called an impromptu press conference. He
announced he would be immediately urging Congress to take action against the
can labeling. \This has just gone too far," he claimed. \We can't let this man
propagate his wild political ideas to people merely attempting to enjoy one of
America's most popular beverages. It's bad enough that George Steinbrenner
has allowed him to plaster Yankee stadium with his political paraphernalia,
while charging hundreds of thousands of dollars to other politicians wishing to
gain access to stadium advertising, and now this!" The President said he would
urge Congress to prohibit political advertising on food and beverage contain-
ers. \The dangers of allowing this kind of advertising are serious. With sales
of products like Coke as high as they are, Americans will be bombarded with
Hussein's message." Asked why that presented a problem, the President noted
5that the problem lies in the monopoly Hussein has on the particular speech
forum. \And, he added, these ideas he's proposing, if he's not lying, at least
he's misleading us. I think the government should be restricting his potentially
dangerous message." Pressed on what scared him so much, besides the possibil-
ity of Hussein winning the election, the President declined to comment in any
detail. Appearing uncomfortable, Mr. Gore shrugged his way out of the White
House press room, slinking sheepishly towards the oval oce.
AP { May 1, 2008
The Associated Press has learned from a reliable source who wishes
to remain anonymous the reason for the President's visible discomfort in the
White House press room the other day as he announced his intention to ban
political advertising from Coke cans. The Central Intelligence Agency has rea-
son to believe presidential candidate Tommy Hussein is the son and political
condant of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The source could not conrm the
CIA's own sources of information, but he is sure the President is convinced of
the veracity of the claim. The source said Gore will do all in his power to make
sure Hussein is not elected. Gore, the AP's source says, is greatly concerned
about what could happen if one who sympathizes with a historical enemy of the
United States were to become the country's chief executive. The source con-
rmed that while Gore understands Tommy Hussein' birth certicate conrms
that he is an American citizen, and that Hussein has resided in this country for
the last fteen years, he cannot ignore the possibility that Hussein is secretly
sympathetic with his Iraqi father.
6AP { May 2, 2008
Presidential candidate Tommy Hussein today vehemently denied alle-
gations rst reported yesterday by the Associated Press that he is the son of
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. \Frankly," he charged, \I'm amazed that the
President would be taken in by such a racist allegation. I am a proud American.
I happened to spend my childhood years in Iraq, and coincidentally, I share the
surname of an American nemesis. But for the President to doubt my patriotism
as a result of my national origin is simply astonishing. I am abbergasted at the
lengths to which the President, clearly in cahoots with my opponent, Governor
Richards, has gone in an attempt to sully my name. If he and Richards have
problems with my political ideas { which they clearly do { let them take their
message to the American people and see whose ideas the public prefers."
The President, for his part, reluctantly declined to deny any of the
allegations in yesterday's story. \I was hoping Hussein would quietly go away,
and that we'd never have to bring this out in the open," he lamented. \But
with his poll numbers rising, it was already nearing the time for action. While
I am certainly perturbed by the fact that top secret information was released
to the press, it was probably only a matter of time before we would have had
to warn the American public o of electing the son of an enemy of the Amer-
ican people." Asked what action he planned to take now, the President said
he hoped the American people would have the good sense to vote for one of
the other candidates { Richards, Quayle, or anyone else { without any other
national security information having to be revealed.
7AP { May 6, 2008
Despite allegations last week that baseball player, actor, business mogul
and presidential hopeful Tommy Hussein may be the son of Iraqi leader Sad-
dam Hussein, recent polls indicate that Hussein is enjoying a 10 point lead over
former Texas Governor Ann Richards, and is running nearly 20 points ahead of
former Vice President Quayle. Polls indicate that those still backing Hussein are
convinced that the President's allegations are entirely fabricated in a desperate
and unprecedented eort to defeat a candidate he sees as undesirable.
Political analysts attribute Hussein's strength in the polls to Hussein's
charm, and to the power and pervasiveness of his advertising campaign. Oth-
ers note that the American people are just unpersuaded by what are certainly
far-fetched claims, and that many are rallying in favor of Hussein because they
are oended by the quasi-racist character of the allegations. Still other political
pundits have theorized that Hussein's popularity with children is rubbing o on
adults. \This guy has really created a stir with kids," said democratic pollster
Jim Thumb. \With kids constantly talking about him, apparently their parents
are beginning to sympathize. As for the allegations about his loyalties, neither
kids nor adults seem to be buying it," said Thumb.
AP { May 27, 2008
Both houses of Congress today voted on the nal version of the Food
Labeling and Sports Advertising Act of 2008. The Act, known for short as
FLSA II, passed by a hefty margin and will now be sent to the White House.
President Gore, who proposed the original idea for the bill, has already indi-
8cated his approval of the nal version, and is sure to sign it when he returns
from his Memorial Day weekend at Camp David.
The law's major provisions are as follows:
1) All writing on food and beverage products { except pictorial rep-
resentations of the product and writings which identify the product, list its
ingredients and nutrition facts, provide information regarding consumption of
the product (such as recipes and serving suggestions) or give information on
the product's manufacturer (address and phone number, for example) { is pro-
hibited. All other writing must be approved by the newly-created PCPA {
President's Committee on Political Advertising. The PCPA is directed to ap-
prove other writings which do not suggest a political message. The denition
of \political message" is left to the Committee. The PCPA, according to the
statute, should only allow political messages to appear on food and beverages
containers when there is \signicant agreement, among experts qualied in po-
litical analysis that the message is both sincere and represents a feasible political
promise." Also, the message must not contain promises which, if carried out,
will be detrimental to the well-being of any substantial portion of the American
public, or which might lead people to vote for candidates whose agendas the
PCPA determines would be damaging to the well-being of a substantial portion
of the American public.
2) Political advertising at any place at which sporting events occur is pro-
hibited. Political advertising in any print medium in any location is limited to a
9statement of the name of the candidate, his or her political party aliation, and
a likeness of the candidate. Political advertisements in broadcast media must
not contain imagery { including cartoons, bright colors, or animal mascots {
designed to appeal to those not of voting age.
The students in Professor Shady's seminar in First Amendment law
were beginning to look up from their desks, quizzical, incredulous looks on their
faces. When they had all nished reading the last article, the professor opened
the class for debate.
Amy: It's not even close to constitutional. I feel like Justice
Kennedy confronting Colorado's Amendment 2.1 Every case we've studied in
this class all but presupposes that political speech can't be censored because of
the message it contains. The whole idea behind the First Amendment, as Jus-
tice Holmes recognized, dissenting in Abrams v. United States,2 is to create a
marketplace of competing ideas and thereby to ensure that the ideas supported
1See Romer v. Evans 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996). Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution
had provided:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination.
Justice Kennedy, for a majority of six justices found the amendment unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, citing very little case law. Recognizing
that Amendment 2 constituted a per se equal protection violation, Justice Kennedy noted,
\A law declaring that in general it shall be more dicult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense." Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1622.
2250 U.S. 616 (1919).
10by the majority of society win the day.3 That idea's been reiterated on numer-
ous occasions up to the present day. It's in New York Times v. Sullivan4 and
the Citizens Against Rent Control case,5 to name just a few. There are tons of
others.
Joe: And it's not even the censorship alone that's problematic here.
There's also a blatantly unconstitutional prior restraint. The Court's made
clear for a long time that prior restraints are especially suspect. There's been
a consistent presumption against their validity from Near v. Minnesota6 to the
Pentagon Papers case7 to Nebraska Press.8
Jon: You guys are denitely right when you cite all that case law, but
this case to me seems even easier than that. I would just cite George Orwell's
1984 as evidence enough. I mean, the PCPA for God's sakes! That's as bad as
3\But when men have realized that time has upset many ghting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas { that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution." Id at 630, (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). (\The general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.
The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' )(internal
citation omitted).
5454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (\The Court has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting
a marketplace for the clash of dierent views and conicting ideas. That concept has been
stated and restated almost since the Constitution was drafted.").
6283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931). In striking down a Minnesota law which allowed for the abate-
ment as a public nuisance of any \malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical," the Court noted:
\[The] fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal
does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint in
dealing with ocial misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the
appropriate remedy."
7New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (denying injunction pro-
hibiting newspapers from publishing national security information and noting, \Any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.").
8Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (striking down order
prohibiting press from reporting on federal criminal trial and labeling prior restraints \the
most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.").
11the Ministry of Truth.
Shady: Whoa, whoa, whoa! Slow down. I made the hypo pretty
straightforward, I admit, and you guys are all certainly on the right track in
assuming it's facially invalid, but there has to be more to it than that. At least
I hope I gave you some reason to see the law as favorable. Pam, you're the
Solicitor General. What would you say to support this law?
Pam: Well, I guess I'd fall back on public health and safety, focusing
on the safety part. The government has a compelling interest { in fact it's prob-
ably the quintessential government interest { in maintaining national security.
I guess I'd combine this with the notion that the Bill of Rights is not a suicide
pact and say that FLSA II is simply necessary to protect national security. It
would be sort of like Haig v. Agee,9 where the Court said the government can
revoke someone's passport if there's a serious risk that that person's activities
while abroad will pose a threat to national security. They even specically
noted there that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.10 This is sort of the
same thing. We're obviously restricting speech, and we may even be doing it
by prior restraint, but is having a First Amendment really necessary if a few
months after we allow Tommy Hussein's political speech, we're a Muslim coun-
try?
Shady: A strong argument, Ms. Solicitor General. Counsel for the
ACLU?
Amy: Am I the only one here who's read the Pentagon Papers case?
9453 U.S. 280 (1981)
10See id. at 309 - 10.
12Here, let me read it again for you: \The word `security' is a broad, vague, gen-
erality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law
embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and diplomatic
secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real
security for our Republic."11
Pam: Thank you Justice Black, concurring in the per curiam judg-
ment, but I don't believe that reasoning commanded a majority of the Court.
And, if you look below where you're reading from, even Justice Brennan con-
cedes that there are national security exceptions worth considering. He cites
the famous \sailing dates" dicta from Near v. Minnesota.12 It just seems to me
that, if Tommy Hussein were Saddam's son, electing him might be as bad as
\publication of the sailing dates of transports."
Amy: Fair enough, but I'd say a couple of things in response. First,
Justice Brennan does decide, in the end, that even the publication of the Pen-
tagon Papers does not create enough of a security risk to justify a prior restraint.
And I think he has to be right, along with Justice Black and the others who
essentially agreed with the two of them in that case. More importantly, while
we don't have a lot of facts in the Tommy Hussein hypo, it seems pretty clear
to me that there's not nearly the sort of imminent danger to the public pending
there that could justify such infringement on First Amendment rights.
Shady: Let me interject here and throw in a small twist, Amy. Once
11Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (Black, J., concurring)
12283 U.S. at 716. (\No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops.").
13the government has had a little { or maybe even a lot { of experience with
the consequences of political speech in certain fora {and the negative eects it
has on the public welfare, can't it simply decide that all speech of a particular
sort in that forum has the potential to have a seriously deleterious eect on the
public welfare, and therefore can't it set up a system { as narrowly tailored as
possible under the circumstances { which would pre-screen speech to make sure
it will not be harmful, before it gets out there and does its damage?13
Amy: In theory, we certainly could have that sort of system, but that's
where the suicide pact notion comes in. You could possibly conceive of a situa-
tion in which the dangers of allowing the speech outweigh any conceivable First
Amendment interest. No one will care if we all get blown to smithereens, would
be the idea. But there would have to be serious danger. I mean, we know that
the danger that a criminal defendant might not get a fair trial is not enough,14
and we even know from Pentagon Papers that the possibility that top secret
national security information will be leaked is not enough.15 So I just doubt
the possibility of someone the current government doesn't agree with getting
elected would be enough.
Pam: But what if there were really good evidence that Tommy Hussein
really was dangerous { that he really did plan to allow his father Saddam to
take over the country?
Alex: You might be right that that's approaching the sort of danger
which would justify forgetting about the First Amendment for the sake of pre-
13cf. infra nn. 144 - 148 and accompanying text.
14See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
15See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
14serving the country. But, you're forgetting that it's not as if there's a zero sum
game going on here. It's not: forget the First Amendment or lose the country
entirely to Iraq. We need to look more carefully to see if there's any conceivable
way to have our cake and eat it too.
Pam: What do you mean? How can we do that?
Alex: Well, if you think about what the whole point of the First Amend-
ment is, it reects the Founders' judgment that the best way to have simultane-
ously eective and free government is to have a robust exchange of ideas. This
is what Justice Holmes was saying in the Abrams case that Amy mentioned a
few minutes ago when we started the debate.16
Bob: So you're saying Hussein gets to advertise however much he wants
and we just have to hope he doesn't win?
Alex: Essentially. The First Amendment stands for the principle that
we can't censor the speech if there's any possibility that counterspeech might
convince those who might otherwise be persuaded by the speech that it's dan-
gerous { or unwise, or whatever { to do what the speaker urges. The First
Amendment says we need to allow a marketplace of ideas just like we let the
market work in the commercial world.
Shady: You make a good point, of course, Alex. But again, there's a
twist here. As with a commercial market, government does have a role to play in
ensuring that the necessary conditions to have an eective market are in place.
They get to regulate, if for no other reason, to take care of the externalities that
16See supra, nn. 2 - 3 and accompanying text.
15the market can't address.
Alex: But how does that play out here? All we have to do is make sure
the government doesn't stie any speech and things should work out.
Pam: But that's not entirely true. Look how the economic market sys-
tem and the speech market system interact. It's perfectly clear in the hypo as
given here. The whole reason \President" Gore and the Congress in 2008 see
the need to restrict political speech on food and beverage containers is that the
owners of the food companies otherwise get to control what speech goes on the
containers. Here the situation's pretty clear. Assuming Hussein's opponents
don't own multi-national soft drink conglomerates, Hussein is simply in a po-
sition to drown out his opponents' advertising by plastering his face on Coke
cans, which are literally everywhere in this country.
Joe: Or look at the billboard advertising in sports stadiums, or spon-
sorship of baseball games. It's great for Tommy Hussein that he happens to play
for the New York Yankees and have George Steinbrenner wrapped around his
nger, but isn't it unfair for him to be the only political gure who has access
to these media?
Amy: But how are you guys proposing we solve this dilemma? I mean
can we just say the governmental interest in ensuring a level playing eld { in
ensuring that all speakers will be able to speak with an equally loud voice {
justies stiing those who are lucky enough to be in a position to convey their
message to more people?
Jon: Didn't the Supreme Court emphatically reject that in Buckley v.
16Valeo?17 I think they said that a government interest in suppressing communi-
cation { even for the sake of leveling the playing eld { can't be a strong enough
interest to justify suppressing communication. In fact, when I state it that way,
I realize it's pretty much tautological to argue otherwise.
Joe: So you're saying Buckley says government can't suppress speech
for the sake of suppressing speech?
Jon: Sounds logical to me.
Joe: But doesn't that just bring us back to square one? I mean, wouldn't
the reasoning of Buckley have to be modied if the government's interest in sup-
pressing speech was extremely strong?
Jon: Maybe. But the point I'm making in referring to Buckley is that
our case is just like that one. The interest the government would be pointing
to in banning political ads on Coke cans and in baseball parks is the interest
in making sure no single politician's voice drowns out the voices of the others
{ which is essentially to say that their interest in suppressing the speech is to
make sure the speech is suppressed.
Joe: No, no, no. My point is that it's not an interest in leveling the
playing eld generally, but rather an interest in leveling the playing eld, in the
situation in which an unlevel playing eld has the possibility of having drastic
consequences.
Bob: I see what you're getting at, Joe, and I think it might make sense,
but I'm still stuck back where I was a few minutes ago. If you're right that there
17424 U.S. 1 (1976).
17could be cases in which we would need to make sure the playing eld is level
so that truly dangerous messages don't get out there, the law is not narrowly
tailored to make sure we get at only those cases, and it is content-based, in that
it allows a government body to decide which cases those are.
Shady: That brings us back to my original question. Might it not be
fair to say that government experience could show that this certain amount of
overbreadth is necessary, because of the years of experience seeing what happens
if we only try to police the danger after the fact?
Alex: But that would require years of prior experience with the dangers
of letting political gures speak in certain fora.
Shady: You're right, and that's not in the hypo. But assume it was.
There had been 10 cases of Tommy Husseins buying up food label space and
sports stadiums, with drastic consequences.
Alex: Fine, but I think your hypo may be so far-fetched that it doesn't
do us any good to talk about what a constitutional response to it would be,
since it would never happen. Unless you're talking about a situation where
the prior experiences did not present truly monumentally dangerous situations.
Because if they did, then there probably wouldn't any longer be a Constitution
left to contemplate protecting. And if those prior situations were not dangerous
enough to have destroyed the entire country, then FLSA II would be way too
drastic a response to them, given the censorship power it gives to the govern-
ment.
Amy: I just think that solution would be too drastic because there are
18always a couple of other ways to deal with even that situation, short of censor-
ship.
Pam: Like what?
Amy: Well, the least constitutionally oensive way would be for the
government itself to engage in speech. Here, it doesn't take much. The govern-
ment just takes out a few high-prole ads that say, essentially, \Hey, dummies:
Tommy Hussein's Saddam's son. You do the math." Or if it can't aord to, or
doesn't want to do that, it can just subsidize people who otherwise would want
to send out that message and make it less costly for them to do so. We know
that kind of subsidy's OK from Rust v. Sullivan.18
Pam: But what if the government can't aord to do that because
of all its other priorities?
Amy: First of all, any danger that's compelling enough to possibly
justify censorship via prior restraint or advertising restrictions should almost by
denition be deserving of a serious devotion of government resources.
Pam: But censorship provides a way for the government to do that with
minimal expense.
Jon: I'm still stuck on this 1984 thing. There are lots of \government
interests" which could be served very inexpensively by censorship. We've got a
compelling interest in ghting crime, so we could just give police authority to
walk up to anyone they want to on the street and search them, or burst into
18500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding HHS regulation restricting funding of health services
clinics at which abortion is available, holding that government can choose to support certain
speech and refuse to subsidize other speech).
19any house they want. But the society that leaves { the 1984 society { is pretty
scary.
Shady: Alright. So what do you do? Just let the Constitution trump
and have all this highly dangerous speech being propagated?
Jon: Well, I guess I agree with Amy. If it's that important, let the
government spend money on counterspeech.
Shady: Is there any more palatable solution?
Amy: I guess there's one other, but it has its own constitutional prob-
lems too. That would be compelled counterspeech, or some sort of equal time
requirement.
Alex: But you're right that there are constitutional problems there too.
I mean, what would the proposal be? Whenever Tommy Hussein wants to
advertise his political candidacy he also has to inform the listener what the
drawbacks of voting for him would be? Not only is that patently absurd, and
not only is it unrealistic to think that the compelled speaker would ever give a
fair presentation of his own faults, or that the government has the capacity to
actually prescribe what words he must say, but most importantly, the Supreme
Court has already said it's unconstitutional. I mean if New Hampshire can't
force someone to put a simple slogan on his license plate,19 how can it tell a
political candidate he must impugn himself whenever he wishes to promote him-
self?
Amy: I agree with you that that would be pretty drastic and would
19See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (nding New Hampshire could not
prosecute a resident for covering the motto \Live Free or Die" on his license plate, on the
ground that freedom of speech includes the \right to refrain from speaking at all.").
20contravene Wooley v. Maynard, but it's better than outright censorship, and
we may at least be willing to go with the lesser of two evils here. But there's
also another alternative. Rather than compelling speech, the law could just
require that all political messages in limited fora { like on Coke cans, or maybe
even in ball parks { be accompanied, in the same forum, by speech expressing
an opposite view. That's exactly what the FCC did in the early days of televi-
sion, and on precisely the theory that the limited size of the forum made such
a restriction necessary, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's action.20
Alex: But aren't there serious problems there too? Yes, the Supreme
Court upheld the fairness doctrine, but only on the theory that there was no
evidence it would actually deter broadcasters from airing political messages.21
Years later, when it became clear that there was such a chilling eect, the FCC
voluntarily repealed the fairness doctrine, citing First Amendment concerns.22
And how is that kind of compelled speech any better than Wooley v. Maynard-
type compelled speech. What about the rights of the speaker not to speak?
Amy: Well, as to your last point, the Court in Red Lion said that the
First Amendment rights of the listeners to get full information outweigh the
rights of the owner of the forum { the broadcasters in that case {not to speak.
I know that sounds shaky, but I would endorse that view, at least for the situ-
ation in which, because of a very compelling government interest, like national
security threats, the alternative would be an outright ban on the speech. And
of course, I would only resort to this doctrine if the law were narrowly tailored
20See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
21See id. at 393.
22See Stone, Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet, Constitutional Law 1429 (2d. ed. 1991).
21somehow to make sure the equal time requirement only kicks in where that sort
of danger exists and where the requirement won't chill less dangerous speech.
And as to your rst point, I would agree with the Red Lion Court that where
there's no evidence of the chilling eect in a given forum, we should wait to
see if there is one before saying the fairness doctrine would be unconstitutional.
And again, even if there is a chilling eect, it's better than the chilling eect {
that is the outright censorship { caused by FLSA II.
Shady: OK. I think we've gotten all the major issues about FLSA II
out there, although we didn't get into a full discussion of this notion that the
law is also tailored to restrict the appeal of political gures to children, but
maybe we'll come back to that notion later in the discussion. And of course, we
haven't reached an ultimate consensus, but that's always the way these things
work out. Anyway, the exercise certainly served as a good review of the speech
doctrine we've learned this year, but I actually had a dual purpose in mind. As
a way of reviewing commercial speech doctrine, I want to examine some hypos
which are not actually hypotheticals. You'll notice Mark and Roger haven't
said anything in the debate so far. That's because they've been sitting quietly
by noting the parallels between the FLSA II hypo and the real laws I've asked
them to research and present here. Mark, why don't you set up the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and the regulation of health claims FDA
has promulgated under it?
Mark: OK. Since at least 1973, the FDA has essentially prohibited {
without really questioning its authority to do so { the making of \health claims"
22on food packages. By health claim, I'm talking now about a rather specic type
of claim, really a claim regarding disease prevention. \Twinkies prevent tooth
decay," for example. Anyway, in 1973, FDA explicitly noted in the Federal Reg-
ister that the making of such claims on food products actually transformed the
food product into a \drug" under the meaning of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act.23
Alex: Hold it. You're saying FDA thinks Twinkies are a drug?
Mark: Well, I know it sounds crazy, but they were interpreting the
statute to say that { if Hostess claimed Twinkies prevent tooth decay.
Alex: You're going to need to chew this for me a little. Pun intended.
Mark: OK. If you look at the denition of \drug" in the FD&C Act {
I've given you guys copies of the relevant portions { you'll see it says in sec-
tion 321 (we're using the U.S. Code numbers here), in part (g)(1)(B) that \The
term `drug' means... articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals."
Amy: So a Twinkie labeled as eective in preventing tooth decay is \in-
tended for use in the... prevention of disease?"
Mark: That was the FDA's position.
Pam: It sounds logical to me. I mean, by labeling it like that, Host-
ess has admitted it intends its product to act as a disease-preventer, so why
shouldn't it have to go through all the FDA rigmarole for a new drug, unless
Twinkies are already \generally recognized as safe and eective" for prevention
23See 38 Fed. Reg. 6951, 6958 (March 14, 1978) (\[I]t must be recognized that claims
related to specic disease conditions render the product a drug under section 201(g)(1)(B) of
the Act.").
23of tooth decay?24
Mark: Well, that was the FDA's position in 1973, and it lasted about
10 years.
Alex: Wait a minute. Something about that seems really troubling.
First of all, I'm looking at this statute here, and it actually says a drug is \ar-
ticles (other than food) intended to aect the structure or any function of the
body."25 Doesn't that suggest pretty plainly that a food can't also be a drug?
Mark: Well, it seems tempting to conclude that, and FDA eventually
tried to take that position,26 but Congress appeared to disagree, arguing that
the separate subsections of the x321(g)(1) denition have to be read as disjunc-
tive to be meaningful.27
Amy: Hold on. That may be fair enough, but I think I can account for
what sounds so illogical about that position. Twinkies illustrate it well. Even
with the tooth decay prevention claim on its package, it's very clear that Hostess
still \intends" Twinkies to be used as nourishment { as a fun, if sickly sweet
way for people to have a snack. An incidental benet of the Twinkies may be
that they prevent tooth decay, and Hostess would be advertising that incidental
24See 21 U.S.C. x 321(p)(1) (dening \new drug" as \Any drug... the composition of
which is such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualied by scientic
training and experience to evaluate the safety and eectiveness of drugs, as safe and eective
for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof);
21 U.S.C. x 355 (prohibiting introduction into interstate commerce of a new drug which is not
the subject of an FDA-approved new drug application).
25321 U.S.C. x321(g)(1)(C) (Alex added the emphasis).
26See \Disease-Specic Health Claims on Food Labels: An Unhealthy Idea," H.R. Rep. No.
100-561, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) at 11. The Human Resources and Intergovernmental
Relations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations noted that at
hearings it had held, FDA Commissioner Young had argued for this approach, quoting the
views of former FDA Chief Counsel Richard M. Cooper to the eect that the subsection
parenthetical qualication should be read as creating an \implicit partial exception for foods"
to the denition in x321(g)(1)(B).
27See id.
24benet, but the straightforward intended use of Twinkies would not be as a
disease-preventer, but as a nourisher. Isn't their enough room in our statutory
interpretation notions to allow for a distinction between primary intended uses
and incidental ones?
MarK: If I were a judge, I might have bought that argument, but this
is all sort of moot, since Congress amended the FD&C Act to deal with the
problem in 1990. But let me just get through a little background before getting
to that. OK, so throughout the 70s and early 80s, FDA took the position that
food labels could not bear health claims, and it prosecuted food manufacturers
which did label their products with such claims.28
Amy: Wait, so FDA just decided what could not be said and prosecuted
people for saying it?
Mark: Yup.
Amy: And the Constitution... ?
Mark: As far as I can tell there was very little consideration of the First
Amendment in these decisions. It was just sort of assumed that FDA had juris-
diction over food and could thus prohibit whatever labeling it wanted. Congress
and the agency tend to talk of FDA \allowing" claims.29 Anyway, while this
was going on, the FTC, which has jurisdiction over all advertising { including
28See id. at 2. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 75990, 76007 (December 21, 1979) in which FDA
rearmed this policy.
29See, e.g. \Disease-Specic Health Claims," supra n.26 at 3 (\FDA was not prepared at the
time, however, to allow labeling that so explicitly linked consumption of a particular brand
with prevention of a specic disease or set of diseases."); see also \Health and Nutrition
Claims in Food Advertising and Labeling, 1990: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Aairs," 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1224 (1990) at 37 (testimony of John La Rosa
on behalf of the American Heart Association, stating, \I think that we have all understood
that the FDA all along has had the authority, if they wished to exercise it, to mandate food
labels and to mandate their content.").
25advertising of food products { was taking a little bit of a dierent approach.
They determined in the early 80s that because truthful speech is protected by
the Constitution, and also because the public benets from truthful information,
explicit health claims which are not false or misleading should not be prohibited
from advertising.30
Amy: Well thank God at least one government agency was coming to
their constitutional senses.
Mark: Well, hold on. The story gets more complicated. In 1984, Kel-
logg's became the rst company to put health claims prohibitions to the test.
Seizing on a National Cancer Institute (NCI) report linking ber to reduction
of cancer, Kellogg's printed the following statements on boxes of their All-Bran
Cereal: \The National Cancer Institute reports that research may suggest eat-
ing the right foods may reduce your risk of some kinds of cancer. Here are their
recommendations: eat high ber foods. A growing body of evidence says high
ber foods are important to good health.... Eat foods low in fat.... Eat fresh
fruits and vegetables.... Eat a well-balanced diet and avoid being over or under
weight...."31
Jon: Was that what NCI had in fact reported?
Mark: Apparently it was, since FDA had actually obtained the approval
of NCI before launching the campaign.32 In any event, FTC, which as I said,
had already said it wanted to encourage truthful health claims, took the Kel-
30See Peter Barton Hutt, \Health Claims for Foods { An American Perspective," Kellogg
Nutrition Symposium, Toronto Canada, April 1986, excerpted in Hutt and Merrill, Food and
Drug Law 183 (1991).
31Quoted in\Disease-Specic Health Claims," supra n.26, at 2 n.9.
32See id. at 5; see also Hutt, supra n.30, at 184.
26logg's opportunity to promote its idea, making speeches endorsing the Kellogg's
label and encouraging other companies to follow their lead.33 After a few years,
the FDA decided it would go along. In 1987, they published new proposed rules
for health claims in the Federal Register.34 The proposal would reverse FDA's
long-standing rule prohibiting disease-specic health claims on food labels,35
and would have set up FDA criteria for the evaluation of health-claims. But
Congress wasn't too keen on the idea.
Amy: Tell me they recognized that the government can't decide what
truthful information a company can put forth.
Mark: Uh... not exactly. In fact, quite the opposite. A subcommittee
of the House Committee on Government Operations determined that any re-
laxation of the FDA's prohibition of all disease-specic health claims would be
contrary to statutory law.36
Amy: FDA had to prohibit all claims?
Mark: Well, pretty much. The subcommittee endorsed the notion that
any such health claim made a food into a drug, and that Congress had explic-
itly set up the procedures a company had to follow in marketing and labeling
drugs.37
Amy: They actually bought that idea. I can't get over this. It just
seems utterly illogical to me. Food is food and drugs are drugs. Just saying
food is good for you magically transforms it into a drug? I mean, come on. It
33Hutt, supra n.30, at 184 - 85.
34See 52 Fed. Reg. 28843 (August 4, 1987).
35Previously codied at 21 C.F.R. 101.9(i) (1989).
36See \Disease-Specic Health Claims," supra n.26.
37See id.
27really doesn't pass the laugh test.
Mark: Maybe not, but the Subcommittee apparently thought it passed
the statutory construction test. And if you think of it that way { in a strict
constructionist mode { maybe it's not really so far-fetched.
Joe: Maybe not, but maybe it also proves too much. If we buy that
construction { and don't read in Amy's distinction between primary intention
and subsidiary { isn't all food essentially intended for the prevention or mitiga-
tion of disease { if you construe it broadly? If nothing else, any food will tend
to prevent starvation, or anorexia at least. I mean, there are even doctors who
tell you to treat food like drugs, because it all contributes to your health and
well-being.38 I mean that's pretty obvious, but once you admit it, where do you
draw the line?
Mark: Fair enough. But Congress didn't worry excessively about any
of this, and instead decided to play it safe39 and explicitly give FDA new statu-
tory authority to permit health claims.40 In 1990, it ocially gave FDA this
38See, e.g., Barry Sears, The Zone: A Dietary Road Map 77 (1995) (emphasis in original):
Food is far more important than just something you eat for pleasure or to appease your
hunger. Rather, it is a potent drug that you'll take at least three times a day for the rest of
your life. Once food is broken down into its basic components... and sent into the bloodstream,
it has a more powerful impact on your body { and your health { than any drug your doctor
could ever prescribe.
39See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336. Without explicitly deciding the issue of FDA's authority to
allow health claims, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce noted in House Report
101-538 (June 13, 1990), in assessing the need for legislation in the area: \[T]here is a serious
question as to whether the Agency has the legal authority to implement the program that it
has proposed, which would permit health claims regarding the usefulness of a food in treating
a disease, without also requiring that the claim meet the pre-market approval requirements
applicable to drugs."
40Congress was also prompted to legislate by the fact that it felt FDA was dragging its feet
in getting regulations on health claims (and nutrition labeling) promulgated. In its June, 1990
report, the House Energy and Commerce Committee noted: \FDA has been unable to issue
nal regulations that establish clear, enforceable rules regarding claims that may be made on
food." 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336. Since the publication of its 1987 proposed rules, see supra,
n.34, FDA had merely published a reproposed rule in February 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 5,176
(Feb. 13, 1990). No nal rule was published by the time President Bush signed the NLEA.
28authority in the form of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,
which is now codied as an amendment to the FD&C Act, at parts (q) and
(r) of 21 U.S.C. x343. For our purposes, Professor Shady asked me to focus
on x343(r), regarding \health-related claims". The statute provides that a food
is misbranded if \a claim is made in the label or labeling of the food which
expressly or by implication... characterizes the relationship... of the food to a
disease or a health-related condition," unless the claim meets certain require-
ments as promulgated by the Secretary of HHS { i.e., the FDA. This is all in
x343(r)(1)(B), which directs you to x343(r)(3). Section 343(r)(3)(B) describes
the regulations which the Secretary (FDA) can promulgate. She can \authorize
claims of the type described in paragraph (1)(B) only if [she] determines, based
on the totality of publicly available scientic evidence... that there is signicant
scientic agreement, among experts qualied by scientic training and experi-
ence to evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence."41
Sections 343(r)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii) provide some details on what sorts of informa-
tion approvable health claims must contain. Other provisions of the Act allow
individuals to petition the Secretary to issue regulations allowing claims { that's
in x343(r)(4)(A)(i) { and to petition the Secretary to grant permission to make
claims consistent with already-approved claims. That's x343(r)(4)(A)(ii).
Amy: So essentially, all health claims are re-banned, but the FDA can
grant exceptions. And you basically have to submit what you want to say to
the FDA to get approval before you can print it. I'm beginning to see how this
4121 U.S.C. x343(r)(3)(B)(i).
29is related to the Tommy Hussein hypo.
Mark: Scary, huh?
Amy: I'll say. And no one questioned whether this would be consti-
tutional?
Shady: Hold on guys, you're getting ahead of the game. The consti-
tutional issues are actually pretty complex, and we'll get to those in a minute,
but let's wait 'til we get the other example on the table.
Mark: Also, I'm not even nished with the law in this area. But the
short answer to your question, Amy, is that as far as I can tell, no one on the Hill
even mentioned the First Amendment in considering the NLEA. Don't quote
me denitively on that, because I didn't have time in the limited amount of
time Professor Shady gave me to look into this to look at all the committee
hearings and other legislative history, but suce it to say that in the major
House report and a few hearings, I saw no mention of the First Amendment.
Anyway, FDA responded to the NLEA by November of 1991, with a proposed
rule.42 They published a nal rule regarding general requirements for health
claims in January of '93.43 That rule is now codied at 21 C.F.R. x 101.14.
FDA denes a health claim as any claim that \characterizes the relationship of
any substance to a disease or health-related condition."44 Claims can be either
express or implied, including in brand names and via symbol, such as a heart
42See 56 Fed. Reg. 60537 (November 27, 1991),
43See 58 Fed. Reg. 2478 (January 6, 1993). This rule does contain a detailed analysis of
the First Amendment's impact on the regulations at pages 2524 - 58
4421 C.F.R. x 101.14(a)(1).
30symbol.45 21 C.F.R. x 101.14 further provides that for a substance to be eligible
for a health claim, \the substance must be associated with a disease or health-
related condition for which the general U.S. population, or an identied U.S.
population subgroup (e.g., the elderly) is at risk," unless the party petitioning
for the claim \otherwise explains the prevalence of the disease or health-related
condition in the U.S. population and the relevance of the claim in the context
of the total daily diet."46 The rule also reiterates the circumstances in which
the FDA will authorize the claim, restating the statutory requirement from 21
U.S.C. x343(r)(3)(B)(i).47 Finally, FDA's rule provides that when conditions
for authorizing a claim are met, FDA will publish a regulation authorizing the
claim.48 At that point, any company can make a claim based on that regulation,
as long as it is \consistent with[] the conclusions set forth in the regulation,"49
\is limited to describing the value that ingestion (or reduced ingestion) of the
substance, as part of a total dietary pattern, may have on a particular disease or
health-related condition,"50 and \is complete, truthful, and not misleading."51
With limited exceptions, \all information required to be included in the claim"
must also \appear[] in one place."52 Furthermore, the claim must be comprehen-
sible to the public.53 And nally, if the claim is about the benets of reducing
45Id.
4621 C.F.R. x 101.14(b)(1).
4721 C.F.R. x 101.14(c) (\FDA will promulgate regulations authorizing a health claim only
when it determines, based on the totality of publicly available scientic evidence... that there
is signicant scientic agreement, among experts qualied by scientic training and experience
to evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.").
4821 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(1).
4921 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(i).
5021 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(ii).
5121 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(iii).
5221 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(iv).
5321 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(v).
31intake of certain substances, there is a threshold amount of that substance the
food can contain,54 and by the same token, if the claim is about eating more
of a particular substance, the food must contain a certain amount of that sub-
stance.55
Amy: So what you're saying is that a government agency has written
a detailed script of what it is that private citizens are allowed to say in certain
situations.
Mark: That's pretty much the scoop.
Shady: But again, I hasten to add that { as we all have already learned
this semester { there are complicated considerations that go into the First
Amendment calculus. It's of course not as open and shut as you make it sound,
Amy.
Amy: Well I'll bite my lip for now, anyway. But I am curious as to
what's happened since FDA set up this system. How many claims has our
friendly government bureaucracy actually \authorized"?
Mark: So far, the FDA has approved nine types of claims, including
the relationship between calcium and osteoporosis (21 C.F.R. x101.72), dietary
lipids and cancer (x101.73), sodium and hypertension (x101.74), saturated fat
and cholesterol and risk of coronary heart disease (x101.75), fruits and vegeta-
bles and cancer (xx101.76 and 101.78), fruits and vegetables and risk of coronary
heart disease (x101.77), folate and neural tube defects (x101.79), and dietary
sugar alcohols and dental caries (x101.80).
5421 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(vi).
5521 C.F.R. x 101.14(d)(2)(vii).
32Alex: That's it? So I can't label my bag of carrots as improving eye-
sight, and I can't make Popeye's Spinach { \Try it, and take on the world's
Blutos"?
Mark: Nope. Not if you want to risk the FDA coming and conscating
your product. I should also note that FDA has proposed some alterations to its
current rules, but so far the proposal has not become codied.56 The new pro-
posal would relax FDA's strict rules in some areas. Whereas the FDA currently
requires a food to have 10% of the RDA of a nutrient in order for a health claim
based on that nutrient to be made, the new rule would lift that requirement
for fruits and vegetables and some enriched grain products. The rule would
also relax the requirement that all claims be made in one place on the package.
And there are a number of other minor changes the rule would eect.57 As I
mentioned, this rule has not become eective, so I assume we should stick to
a constitutional analysis of the current rule. Of course, I'm not sure the new
proposal would really change anything in any event.
Shady: Thanks Mark. We'll get to the constitutionality in a few
minutes. I just want to get the tobacco regulations on the table. Roger?
Roger: Congress has not been nearly as involved in the regulation
of cigarette marketing, labeling and advertising in recent years as they have
been in the eld of food labeling and advertising. But President Clinton and
his allies in FDA have seen t to pick up the slack. In 1995, President Clinton
56See 60 Fed. Reg. 66206 (December 21, 1995).
57See id; see also Beatrice Trum Hunter, \Relaxing the Rules on Food Labels," 4/1/96
Consumers' Res. Mag. 18 (1996).
33declared war on teenage smoking.58 He did attempt to solicit aid from Congress,
but knowing opposition would be formidable, Clinton threatened that the FDA
would take action quickly if Congress didn't.59 When Congress essentially called
the presidential blu, he and the FDA didn't balk, and by August of 1996, after
receiving numerous comments on the rule they had proposed in 1995,60 FDA
published a nal rule in the Federal Register.61
Pam: I'm a little confused about this. You're saying it was just a race
{ either Congress could act or the FDA could? I mean, if it's the kind of thing
that requires a federal law, how does FDA have the authority to do it as well?
Are cigarettes food? Or drugs? They're certainly not cosmetics, and I can't see
how they're medical devices...
Roger: Funny you should ask. There are a lot of people asking the same
thing, and some of them have even asked it of a federal judge.62 The short an-
swer is that FDA says nicotine is a drug and that tobacco { either in a cigarette
or in smokeless form { is a \nicotine-delivery device" and thus a medical device.
A lot of ink has been spilled defending that proposition,63 but I suppose for now,
the best thing to do is presume, for the sake of argument that FDA has the ju-
58See Todd S. Purdam, \Teenagers and Tobacco: Clinton Proposes Broad Plan to Curb
Teen-Age Smoking," N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1995, at A1.
59See \Teenagers and Tobacco: Excerpts from Clinton News Conference on His Tobacco
Order," N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1995, at A18.
60See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (August 11, 1995).
61See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (August 28, 1996) (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897).
62See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV0059 (M.D.N.C. led Aug. 10, 1995).
63See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (August 28, 1996); Defendants' Brief In Opposi-
tion To Plaintis' Motions For Summary Judgment in Coyne Beahm, supra n.62;
FDA, \Executive Summary: Annex: Nicotine in Cigarettes And Smokeless Tobacco
Is a Drug And These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," 1996, available on the World-wide Web at URL:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/campaigns/tobacco/execsum.html. For an opposing view, see
Lars Noah and Barbara A. Noah, \Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Eort to Reg-
ulate Tobacco Products," 48 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
34risdiction to regulate tobacco products, and move on to the constitutionality.
One way to think about it for now is just to presume that a government agency
can do whatever it wants, and that Congress always has the power to correct
it later if it wants. Hopefully, we could argue, the agency will not be able to
get away with outrageous actions, especially politically unpopular ones, because
this could be fatal for the Chief Executive. In other words, one way of looking
at it for now is that if what FDA is doing was not what the majority of citizens
wanted, it might have cost Clinton the '96 election { and given that there's
also the democratic possibility of Congress correcting the FDA, we shouldn't be
too worried about what the FDA's done. And from a legalistic point of view,
if FDA's statutory authority is open to more than one interpretation, and the
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is at least reasonable, the courts will let them
get away with it. They have to, under Chevron v. NRDC.64
Pam: It still sounds pretty undemocratic to me. Wouldn't we rather
have popularly elected people doing this than appointed bureaucrats?
Roger: Maybe. But for now, FDA's done it. I think Professor Shady
would prefer us to focus on the First Amendment issues, in the interest of time.
Shady: He's right, Pam. These are fascinating and complicated issues,
but we only have time to cover the First Amendment stu today. So Roger,
let's see if we can get the regulations' major provisions on the table.
Roger: OK. The relevant new regulations are codied at 21 C.F.R., in
part 897. First, it's worth noting that the \Purpose" section of the regs ex-
64467 U.S. 837 (1984).
35plicitly notes that \[t]he purpose of this part is to establish restrictions on the
sale, distribution, and use of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco in order to re-
duce the number of children and adolescents who use these products."65 That
will probably become highly relevant as we analyze the constitutionality of these
regs. A number of the other regs don't appear to have serious First Amend-
ment implications.66 These include: imposition of a federal minimum age for
purchasing tobacco products of 18,67 with an obligation imposed on retailers to
check IDs;68 prohibitions of \kiddie packs" of cigarettes { that is, boxes contain-
ing fewer than 20 cigarettes;69 prohibition of vending machines and self-serve
displays, except in places to which minors are denied admittance 24 hours a
day;70 and a ban on distribution of free samples.71 The rest of the regula-
tions are more problematic. FDA begins with the following generous grant, in
part 897.30: \A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer may, in accordance with
this subpart D, disseminate or cause to be disseminated advertising or labeling
which bears a cigarette or smokeless tobacco brand name... in newspapers; in
magazines; in periodicals or other publications... on billboards, posters, and
placards; in non-point-of-sale promotional material (including direct mail); in
point-of-sale promotional material; and in audio or video formats delivered at
6521 C.F.R. 897.2 (Roger added the emphasis).
66See generally FDA, \Executive Summary: The Regulations Restricting the Sale
and Distribution Of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adoles-
cents," August 1996. This publication is available on the World-wide Web at URL:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/campaigns/tobacco/execrule.html.
6721 C.F.R. x897.14(a).
6821 C.F.R. x897.14(b)
6921 C.F.R. x897.16(b)
7021 C.F.R. x897.16(c)
7121 C.F.R. x897.16(d)
36a point-of-sale."72 The next section requires companies wishing to advertise in
any other medium to get prior clearance from the FDA,73 and the third subsec-
tion of that part prohibits outdoor advertising of tobacco products within 1,000
feet of a playground or school.74 Part 897.32 bears the innocuous title \Format
and content requirements for labeling and advertising".
Jon: Orwell really should have called the book \1996".
Shady: Ah- ahem.
Jon: Sorry.
Roger: Anyway, you can tell I'm really fond of these regulations, too. In
any event, part 897.32 provides that with a few exceptions, print advertising of
tobacco products can only consist of black text on a white background.75 The
exceptions are for advertising in publications whose readers are mostly over
18 { the publication has to have a readership of fewer than 15% minors and
fewer than 2 million minors total76 { and for stationary advertising in places to
which minors do not have access { the same places where vending machine and
self-serve sales are permitted.77 897.32 also scripts permissible audio and video
advertising. It provides: \Audio format shall be limited to words only with no
music or sound eects,"78 and \Video formats shall be limited to static black
text only on a white background. Any audio with the video shall be limited
to words only with no music or sound eects."79 The regulations also require
7221 C.F.R. x897.30(a)(1).
7321 C.F.R. x897.30(a)(2).
7421 C.F.R. x897.30(b).
7521 C.F.R. x897.32(a).
7621 C.F.R. x897.32(a)(2).
7721 C.F.R. x897.30(a)(1).
7821 C.F.R. x897.32(b)(1).
7921 C.F.R. x897.32(b)(2).
37that all advertising bear a statement of what the product being advertised is
{ cigarettes, chewing tobacco, snu, or whatever { along with the words, \A
Nicotine-Delivery Device for Persons 18 or Older".80 There is also a ban on
things like T-shirts and hats which have tobacco logos of some sort on them,81
and a restriction on giving away free gifts with tobacco products.82 Finally, a
regulation which has caused a lot of commotion in the auto-racing industry83
provides that tobacco companies can't sponsor \athletic, musical, artistic, or
other social or cultural" events by using their products' logos, mottos, etc. The
companies can sponsor such events, but only using their corporate name in iso-
lation.84 The majority of these provisions become eective in August of 1998.85
Shady: Thanks Roger. Now we can get into evaluating how the to-
bacco regulations and the health claims restrictions stand up to constitutional
scrutiny.
Amy: I don't think they do. I know you set it up intentionally, but I
just don't see the distinctions between these laws and the FLSA II hypo.
Shady: Slow down, Amy. You know there's one big distinction.
Amy: Commercial speech? Can I be blunt here and say what I really
think?
8021 C.F.R. x897.32(c).
8121 C.F.R. x897.34(a).
8221 C.F.R. x897.34(b).
83See, e.g., Daniel Helberg, \Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on
Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine," 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1219,
1220 - 22 (1996) (discussing impact on racing industry, citing Jeanne Whalen, \Cigarette
Interest Flags in Racing," Advertising Age, Dec. 6, 1993 at 28, and discussing attached
advertisement featuring NASCAR driver Richard Petty); see also David A. Locke, \Counter-
speech as an Alternative to Prohibition: Proposed Federal Regulation of Tobacco Promotion
in American Motorsport," 70 Ind. L.J. 217 (1994).
8421 C.F.R. x897.34(c). See generally
85See 61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (August 28, 1996).
38Shady: Be our guest.
Amy: I think the Supreme Court went way o course back in 1942 with
Valentine v. Chrestensen86 and hasn't suciently corrected itself since.
Joe: For the sake of those of us who are not exactly on top of all the
material, could you just chew what you're talking about for a minute?
Amy: Sure. Chrestensen is the rst case where the Supreme Court
made up this bogus distinction between \commercial" and \non-commercial"
speech. New York had a \sanitary code" prohibiting distribution of \commer-
cial" handbills. Chrestensen was arrested for doing just that and took the case
to the Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds. The Court rejected his
claim, stating simply that it is \clear the Constitution imposes no... restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising."87
Joe: But wasn't that case quickly reversed?
Amy: Well, I wouldn't say \quickly," and \reversed" may be a little
strong. The rst case to back signicantly away from Chrestensen came in the
wake of the Supreme Court's recognition of a fundamental right to abortion.
In 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia,88 the Court held that the state could not in-
terfere with the advertising of the availability of abortions. That might not be
commercial speech, and the case might have been connable to its own facts {
specically the Supreme Court's new-found eagerness to safeguard a woman's
right to choose { but the following year, the Court really did breathe strong
life into the First Amendment as a protector of commercial speech. In the
86316 U.S. 52 (1942).
87Id. at 54.
88421 U.S. 809 (1975).
39Virginia Board of Pharmacy case,89 the Court held that the First Amendment
does indeed protect purely commercial speech. There the speech was advertising
the price of prescription drugs. The Court determined that the very diculty
of distinguishing purely commercial speech from more publicly useful speech
{ especially given consumers' interest, in a free market economy, in receiving
commercial information { made it unnecessary to attempt to do so.90
Pam: But didn't Virginia say that it had a good reason to restrict price
advertising of prescription drugs? Weren't they concerned competition would
lead to a race to the bottom, meaning inferior pharmacists and, eventually,
compromised public health?
Amy: They did indeed.91 But Justice Blackmun didn't think that jus-
tied the restriction. Noting that the government was essentially promoting
public health by trying to keep the public in the dark, he suggested that an
alternative approach would be to allow the information to ow and to assume
that \people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
89Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
90See id. at 765:
[T]here is another consideration that suggests that no line between publicly interesting or
important commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn. Advertising,
however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of in-
formation as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free ow of commercial information is indispensable.... And if
it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be reg-
ulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free
ow of information does not serve that goal.
See also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995) (\The free ow
of commercial information is `indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system' because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system.").
91See id. at 767 - 78.
40informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of com-
munication rather than to close them."92 He concluded, however, that \the
choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia
General Assembly's." Instead, he noted, \[i]t is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse
if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."93
Alex: Sounds like it seals all our cases { tobacco, NLEA, and FLSA II.
Bob: Well, not exactly, I don't think. Despite Blackmun's grandiose
language, Amy neglects to mention that he did drop a footnote, which became
the much more important aspect of the case.
Amy: I didn't neglect to mention it. I just hadn't gotten there yet.
Remember, I admitted that the Supreme Court has never fully corrected its
Chrestensen mistake?
Bob: True enough. In fact, Virginia Board can be read as only slightly
modifying Chrestensen, if you focus on its footnote 24, as most people did.
Joe: You all are getting ahead of me again. What did this all-important
footnote actually say?
Amy: Here, I'll read it, since it still forms the basis for the commercial/non-
commercial distinction today: \In concluding that commercial speech enjoys
First Amendment protection, we have not held that it is wholly undierentiable
from other forms. There are commonsense dierences between speech that does
`no more than propose a commercial transaction,' and other varieties. Even if
92Id at 770.
93Id.
41the dierences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is value-
less, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless
suggest that a dierent degree of protection is necessary to insure that the ow
of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of
commercial speech, for example, may be more easily veriable by its dissemina-
tor than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily
the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specic product or ser-
vice that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone
else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since
advertising is the Sine qua non of commercial prots, there is little likelihood of
its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. Attributes such as
these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it
less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.
They may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message ap-
pear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and dis-
claimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive. They may also make
inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints."94
Pam: Whoa! That sounds like it settles our cases { except FLSA II {
in favor of the constitutionality of the laws we're talking about.
Alex: Well, I don't know if I'd go that far, but the \common sense dif-
ferences," along with the \veriability" and \durability" notions have gotten a
lot of mileage over the last 20 years.
94Id. at 771 n.24.
42Amy: But not exactly as much as you might think Those notions justi-
ed more regulation of commercial speech than of other speech, but the Court
didn't let the Virginia Board footnote overpower its main body. It remained
skeptical especially, of any speech restriction meant to accomplish non-speech
goals, and has remained so right up to last term.95 In 1980, the Court ocially
announced a middle ground test for commercial speech. In evaluating a New
York law prohibiting the electric company from running ads promoting electric-
ity consumption in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,96 the Court set out an explicit four-part test for evaluating com-
mercial speech restrictions.
Joe: Wait. Hasn't that test been modied quite a bit? Is it still good
law?
Amy: Well, it was modied slightly a couple years ago in the Florida
Bar case,97but that was really only semantic, and the crux of the test survived.
Last year, in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,98 a severely divided Court left
the status of the Central Hudson test in a state of confusion, but if you count
noses, the test is still hanging on by a thread.
Shady: Just for the sake of those who haven't reviewed as much as
you guys have, can we go back and get the Central Hudson test itself on the
table?
95See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996).
96447 U.S. 557 (1980).
97See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
98116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996).
43Bob: Sure. I'll lay it out. The Court set up four prongs. The rst is
the inquiry about the type of speech involved. If the speech concerns unlaw-
ful activity, or is misleading, the First Amendment does not protect it.99 If it
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, the Court moves on to look into
the asserted government interest.100 If the government interest is substantial
enough, the third and fourth prongs inquire whether the law \directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest."101
Shady: To make it a little simpler, let me quote a law review article I
read recently. As the authors put it, \In other words, assuming that the speech
does not relate to some unlawful activity and is not inherently misleading, the
government may restrict commercial speech only to achieve a substantial inter-
est, and then only to the extent necessary?"102
Bob: That's useful, but doesn't it sort of mush together the last two
prongs? I mean, don't courts have to be careful in assessing \the extent neces-
sary," to look into both the extent of \direct advancement" of the government
interest and whether it is more extensive than necessary.
Shady: Fair enough. Don't forget the \direct advancement" part.
Pam: OK. So the tobacco regs and the health-claims regs get this
intermediate-type scrutiny and we just apply it and see what happens.
Alex: Easier said than done. Much easier. If you look how the Court
99See id. at 566
100See id.
101Id.
102Lars Noah and Barbara A. Noah, \Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling
Controls and the First Amendment," 47 Fla. L. Rev. 63, 77 (1995).
44has applied the test over the years, you realize that they can basically do what-
ever they want with it.103
Amy: Yeah, I mean where's the distinction between prohibiting com-
mercial billboards while allowing certain sorts of non-commercial billboards
(which the Court disallowed),104 prohibiting advertising of casino gambling di-
rected at a specic population (which the Court allowed),105 prohibiting dis-
tribution of commercial newsletters on newsracks placed on public property
(disallowed),106prohibiting advertising of state lotteries on broadcast media (al-
lowed),107 and prohibiting advertising of liquor prices (disallowed)?108
Pam: Well, doesn't it just depend upon the facts of each case { the law
at issue, the alternative approaches available, the government interest involved,
etc.? It's a test to be applied. Dierent cases will come out dierent ways. For
the sake of predictability, would anyone prefer a more strict rule, which would
be bound to either over-protect or under-protect speech in the long run?
Amy: How do you over-protect speech?
Pam: Well, look at the rst prong of the test. Or look at our Tommy
Hussein hypo. You overprotect speech if the marginal benets of having open
communications is far outweighed by the government interest involved.
103See id. at 78; see also Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, \Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech," 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 631 (1990) (mounting a rather caustic attack on the malleability
of the Central Hudson test and the unpredictability of cases to be decided under it); Michael
W. Field, \On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: Last Call for the Commercial
Speech Doctrine," 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 57, 59 - 61 (1996) (discussing 16 year history
of Supreme Court uncertainty about commercial speech and inability of litigants to predict
outcomes).
104See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
105See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
106See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S.410 (1993).
107See United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
108See 44 Liquormart, supra n.95.
45Amy: But I just don't think you can underestimate the importance of
the free speech interest. As Justice Blackmun says, the Constitution itself does
the balancing for us.109 Justice Brennan made the same point in the gambling
advertising case, Posadas.110
Jon: That was in dissent though, right?
Amy: Yeah, but it was brilliant. Rehnquist had come up with a
totally inane \greater includes the lesser rationale" for the restriction at issue
there. He said, \It would... surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which
would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activ-
ity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand
for the product or activity through advertising."111 Brennan responded that the
\`constitutional doctrine' which bans Puerto Rico from banning advertisements
concerning lawful casino gambling is not so strange a restraint { it is called the
First Amendment."112
Mark: Oh come on. That's sort of a cute retort, but you know it
just begs the question. I mean just saying \it's unconstitutional; see the First
Amendment," doesn't solve anything.113 The First Amendment has to be in-
terpreted by the Court, and the Court has said there's a meaningful distinction
109See supra, n.93 and accompanying text.
110See supra, n.105.
111Posadas, supra n.105, at 346.
112Id. at 355, n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113cf. Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, \Colloquy: The First Amendment In A Commercial
Culture Response: The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech," 71 Tex. L.
Rev. 747 (1993) (\The First Amendment poses a dicult practical problem: It is quite short
and does not explain what counts as `speech,' what counts as `freedom,' or what counts as
`abridging.' To ll the chasm between the broad rule and its application to specic cases, a
great deal of thinking has to be done.").
46between commercial and non-commercial speech. And, despite misgivings being
articulated by specic justices throughout the years, the Court has stuck to that
distinction, right up through their latest commercial speech case.114
Alex: Yes, but does the distinction make any sense? That's what all
this should turn on.
Mark: Well then let's look at where it came from.
Amy: Thin air. The Chrestensen Court literally made it up out of whole
cloth.115
Mark: You're so knee jerk, Amy. That may be true, but modern com-
mercial speech doctrine really only starts with Virginia Board, so we can at least
look at that Court's reasoning for giving commercial speech less protection.
Amy: Oh, that's right. I forgot. \Commonsense dierences." Real per-
suasive.
Mark: Oh, come on Amy. You don't agree that there are commonsense
dierences? I don't mean to get us into a deep philosophical discussion of what
it is the First Amendment is really protecting, but don't we just care more
about Tommy Hussein's political message than R.J. Reynolds' commercial one?
Amy: Well, there may be some slight dierences in importance which
are \commonsense" between purely political speech and purely commercial speech
114See 44 Liquormart, supra, n.95.
115See Kozinski and Banner, \Who's Afraid," supra n.103, at 628 (internal citation omitted):
The most remarkable aspect of [Chrestensen] is that it cites no authority. None. Instead,
the opinion, disposes of the issue in one sentence: `We are... clear that the Constitution
imposes no... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.' And so
was born the commercial speech doctrine. Without citing any cases, without discussing the
purposes or values underlying the rst amendment, and without even mentioning the rst
amendment except in stating Chrestensen's contentions, the Court found it clear as day that
commercial speech was not protected by the rst amendment.
47{ as the Virginia Board Court put it, speech which does no more than commu-
nicate the message, \I will sell you the X... at the Y price."116
Mark: OK, then.
Amy: Well, but the problem comes in when you recognize that the
world is never that black and white. Almost all speech is somewhere stuck in
the gray, middle area between pure commercial and pure political speech. So
how do you know what kind of protection the speech gets? I mean there's some-
thing in itself unconstitutional-sounding about the idea of the Supreme Court
determining how to classify speech, even if they had the capacity to do it.117
And how would they do it? The lines just blur so easily.118
Joe: I think I need some examples here. Because it seems to me that
you can pretty much tell when speech is commercial.
Amy: Well, here's an example. How about a disease-specic health
claim on the label of a food product?
Pam: Well, but isn't that pretty clearly commercial? We all know Kel-
logg's doesn't print the NCI report on the side of All-Bran boxes for its health,
so to speak. It puts it there to sell cereal.
Amy: And you want the government looking into the true motive of
one who puts forth a public service message?
Pam: But we just know what the motive is. The court or the FDA or
whoever doesn't actually have to look.
116See Virginia Board, supra n.89, at 761.
117See Helen McGee Konrad, \Eliminating Distinctions Between Commercial and Political
Speech: Replacing Regulation with Government Counterspeech," 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1129, 1139 - 40 (1990).
118See generally, Kozinski and Banner, \Who's Afraid," supra n.103, at 638 - 48.
48Amy: OK. Let's make it a little harder. Consider this ad sponsored
by Philip Morris which I've passed around, which simply reminds the reader
of the importance of the Bill of Rights in our nation's history, and rather than
selling anything, oers to give copies of the Bill of Rights away for free.119 If
anything, that sort of speech sounds rather political. But we all know who
Phillip Morris is, and if we have any knowledge of government regulations like
the ones we're discussing today { or of the milder ones in eect at the time this
ad ran, banning cigarette ads on broadcast media120 { then we have a pretty
good idea what the true motivation for the ad is. Does that make it fair to call
the speech commercial?121
Pam: That's tricky. But I think it would be fair to say that's not
really commercial speech and that it therefore deserves more full protection.
Alex: More full?
Pam: Yeah, well maybe if we've got a continuum from purest political
speech to purest commercial, we can set up a continuum of amount of protec-
tion.
Alex: Well I guess that's not so crazy, but it sounds a little dicult to
administer.
Amy: And it presumes that there's a good reason to protect commercial
speech less.
119The ad was printed in L.A. Times, Dec. 7, 1989 at D20.
120See 15 U.S.C. xx 331 - 39.
121Amy gets her argument, and her specic example, from Kozinski and Banner, \Who's
Afraid," supra n.103, at 645 - 46. That article contains further compelling illustrations of her
point.
49Pam: What happened to veriability and durability?122
Amy: Alright. Let's talk veriability of disease-specic health claims.
Isn't the whole reason the FDA says they can ban them because they're con-
cerned that the claims might be misleading precisely because they are not yet
scientically veriable? If the whole reason we presume speech should be en-
tirely free in political matters is because no single politician can have a monopoly
on truth { because no political claim is veriable, why doesn't the same hold
for unveriable scientic claims. How is: \Vote for me and the economy will
get better" any dierent from: \Some studies have shown that if you eat this
product, you're less likely to get cancer?"123
Pam: Because people just accept that it is somehow more important
that political speech be free and open.
Amy: But what really matters more to the average person's everyday
life? What they eat or who is sitting in any particular political oce?
Bob: Well, if Saddam Hussein's son is sitting in the Oval Oce, it may
matter a lot.
Amy: And, the FDA argues, it may matter just as much if people eat
food thinking it will prevent them from getting a certain disease when that
product is actually unhealthy, or if people { particularly young people { use
a certain drug for recreational purposes because they think it will make them
cool, like Joe Camel or the Marlboro man, when in fact it will cause them to
122See Virginia Board, supra n.89, at 771 n.24; see also supra, nn. 93 - 95 and accompanying
text.
123Cf. Martin Redish, \Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientic Ex-
pression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech," 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1433, 1437 (1990)
(arguing that claims such as Amy's last example should get full First Amendment protection).
50die young.
Alex: But something's backwards here. Now you're saying that because
the government deems an issue important, that's all the more reason they can
restrict talk about it?
Amy: Well, that's the irony, as far as I'm concerned. But we were
supposed to be talking about veriability. My point is simply that so-called
\commercial" speech is often no more veriable than political speech and thus
that that notion can't justify diminished protection for supposed commercial
speech.
Jon: OK. What if I temporarily concede that the veriability notion
doesn't work so well? What about the durability claim? Isn't the notion that,
due to prot motive, commercial speakers are less likely to be entirely deterred
by government regulation than are non-commercial speakers compelling logic?
Amy: I think not. I don't know of a reason to think that fully pro-
tected speech with no prot motive { be it artistic, political, or even religious
speech { would be any less durable in lots of instances than speech motivated
by prot. By the same token, we already fully protect plenty of speech forms
which do have prot as a major motivator behind them. Filmmaking is a good
example. Or news reporting.124
Alex: Or you can look at this from the reverse direction. Regulations
like the tobacco and health-claims ones we're talking about here may be so pow-
124Once again, Amy has been reading Kozinski and Banner, \Who's Afraid," supra n.103,
at 637; see also Konrad, supra n.117, at 1138 - 39.
51erful that they actually do deter the speaker, despite the speaker's obvious prot
motive in speaking. Kellogg's simply will not be able to say its All-Bran ghts
cancer if the FDA doesn't let them. That message will very likely simply not
get out there. Or if it does, through more protected forms of speech { Kellogg's
writes a book about it, or mails out pamphlets or something { it will still not
reach nearly as wide an audience as the speech would if unregulated.
Amy: And of course what you're saying clearly points up the absurdity
of this whole thing. The form a piece of information takes determines its fate?
How are we about to distinguish Kellogg's writing that its product combats
cancer right on its box, from Kellogg's running an advertisement on TV or in a
newspaper saying the same thing, from Kellogg's CEO publishing a book about
the healthfulness of products which Kellogg's happens to make, from the CEO's
writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper about All-Bran's qualities, from the
President of the National Cancer Institute talking about the benets of eating
bran on the Today Show? What if Kellogg's paid the NCI president's expenses
for his travel to New York? Doesn't it all just show we're slicing the baloney
too thin?
Alex: And, to get back to durability. In these situations in which the
whole point of regulating the speech is that the government thinks it would be
dangerous for the public to receive the information the speaker would like to
convey, why is the fact that the speech might be durable a reason to justify
regulating it. The Court's saying, \If we know regulation will be futile in actu-
ally defeating the message, then it's OK to regulate the speech." That certainly
52makes no sense when the only justication we have for regulating the speech is
that we want it to go away.
Bob: And that's especially true when you look at the Central Hudson
test's requirement that a speech restriction be eective in serving the govern-
ment's substantial interest.125
Roger: OK. Alright. I get the picture. You guys think the distinc-
tion can't be justied. But what do you do about the fact that the Supreme
Court just hasn't agreed? Last I checked, the Central Hudson test is still good
law. That means commercial speech gets a dierent level of scrutiny from non-
commercial speech.
Jon: What we do about it is try to analyze these things under Central
Hudson. Unfortunately, that requires us to know where the Central Hudson
test really stands today?
Shady: I guess it does, and as some of us who have been reading U.S.
Law Week this year know, where it stands is basically up in the air. Anyone
want to ll us in?
Bob: Sure. I think I can take this one. Apparently, the current Supreme
Court just doesn't know what to do with commercial speech. Last spring, they
handed down an opinion which seemed like it almost could have set things
straight, but the Court was so sharply divided that the law is probably even
more confused than it was before the Court took the case.126 The state law at
issue banned price advertising of alcoholic beverages. Everyone on the Court
125See supra, nn. 99 - 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson test).
126See 44 Liquormart, supra, n.95.
53agreed on one thing: the law was unconstitutional. But the justices all came
to that conclusion in very dierent ways. Essentially, here's how it broke down:
Justice Thomas declared that the Central Hudson test should simply be aban-
doned { at least for those situations in which the asserted government interest is
an interest in keeping legal users of a product from receiving information about
it. I emphasize that he restricted the notion to government eorts directed at
curbing legal activities because it may become relevant later.127
Alex: But you're saying no one else was willing to go as far as Justice
Thomas in throwing out Central Hudson?
Amy: And even he wouldn't go all the way. So the result is that no one
on the Court is yet willing to put commercial speech on exactly the same plane
as non-commercial, despite Justice Thomas' recognition of the silliness of the
distinction.128
Bob: That's essentially the upshot. Anyway, Justice Stevens wrote the
\controlling opinion," for a shifting plurality of anywhere from three to six jus-
tices. He agreed with the tenor of Justice Thomas' opinion { that truthful
non-misleading speech about lawful activity should not lightly be deterred for
other government motives. As he put it, \The First Amendment directs us to
be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
127See id. (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
128See id at 1517 - 18 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(interior citations omitted):
The Court has at times appeared to assume that `commercial speech could be censored in
a variety of ways for any of a variety of reasons because, as was said without clear rationale
in some post-Virginia Pharmacy Bd. cases, such speech was in a `subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values, or of `less constitutional moment.' I do not see a
philosophical or historical basis for asserting that `commercial' speech is of `lower value' than
`non-commercial' speech.
54what the government perceives to be their own good."129 Justice Stevens just
didn't go as far as Justice Thomas. Preserving the core of the Central Hudson
test { its four prongs { he simply concluded that when it comes to a state reg-
ulation which \entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargain-
ing process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands,"130 and therefore a more strenuous form
of Central Hudson review should be applied.131 According to Justice Stevens,
the state's law was not eective \to a material degree" in achieving its stated
goal,132 and was more extensive than necessary.133 Thus it failed this enhanced
Central Hudson scrutiny test.
Jon: Wait a minute. It sounds like the Court has done a huge about
face in just 10 years. I mean, in Posadas, the Court was willing to let the
legislature make any reasonable choice as to how best to serve its substantial
interest in reducing gambling among Puerto Rico's residents.134
Bob: Well, remember, this was only a plurality opinion, but the plural-
ity did soundly reject all of the reasoning of Posadas,135 including the notion
Amy was criticizing earlier that the supposedly \greater" power to outlaw gam-
129116 S.Ct. at 1508.
130Id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg).
131See id. at 1508 (Stevens, J., joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg).
132Id. at 1509 - 10.
133See id. at 1510 (\It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not
involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the state's goal of promoting
temperance.").
134See Posadas, supra, n.105, at 344 (determining that it was \up to the legislature" to de-
cide among the various alternatives { suppressing advertising, engaging in educational coun-
terspeech, or banning gambling altogether).
135See 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1511 (\[W]e conclude that a state legislature does not
have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic
purposes that the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate.").
55bling must necessarily include the \lesser" power to prohibit advertising pro-
moting gambling.136
Amy: And didn't everyone on the Court basically agree with that re-
jection?
Bob: It certainly seems like it, if it's not crystal clear.137
Alex: So I assume { unless someone's willing to take on all nine of the
sitting Supreme Court justices { that we can all agree that even if FDA had the
power to ban tobacco use and sale entirely, we would still have to give at least
some form of Central Hudson scrutiny which is not wholly deferential.
Pam: I'm not saying I'm ready to disagree with nine such formidable
opponents, but I could use a little more persuading. And might I add that I
certainly wouldn't be going out on too much of a limb in buying that reasoning.
I mean, it's not as if some two-bit law professor made that argument in the
rst place. Six Supreme Court justices { including three who are sitting on the
current Court138 { bought into that logic.
Alex: Well the key is that the syllogism sounds nice { and even obvi-
ous. Of course greater powers include lesser ones. The problem comes in the
assumption that there is anything less intrusive about outlawing speech than
about outlawing conduct. First o, the First Amendment itself is pretty good
136See id. at 1512 (nding this notion \inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doc-
trine," and \reject[ing] the notion that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than ac-
tions.").
137See id. at 1513 (\As the entire Court apparently now agrees, the statements in the Posadas
opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive."); id at 1522 (O'Connor J.,
with whom Rehnquist, C.J. and Souter and Breyer, J.J. joined, concurring in the judgment)
(noting that since Posadas the Court has consistently applied a more strict form of scrutiny
than had that Court).
138Pam is referring to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor.
56evidence that this country considers the power to ban speech a pretty \great"
power indeed. And second of all, there's sort of an accountability problem with
speech bans. The fact of the matter is that legislatures may often not have
enough of a political mandate to ban certain activities { smoking is a perfect
example. To ban speech about these activities as a way to do what the people
really don't want you to do is highly undemocratic, to say the least.139
Pam: But maybe FDA actually does have a political mandate to regu-
late cigarette advertising, even if the public is not ready to see cigarettes banned
entirely. As Roger pointed out in describing the regs, if there hadn't been pop-
ular support for them, it might have cost Clinton the election.140
Alex: No one's suggesting that there isn't popular support for the mea-
sures we're discussing here. We're only discussing whether they're unconstitu-
tional { an entirely dierent inquiry.
Pam: But you were just saying that government can't always ban speech
even if they could ban conduct, because it's undemocratic. I'm saying that in
some cases, banning speech may be the democratic thing to do.
Alex: Yes, but not if it's unconstitutional. And my point is that the
Constitution expresses a preference for open debate on all issues { for free speech
{ so that the public can make informed and free choices on all matters in life.
The fact that you can point to a popular consensus on a particular issue { a
consensus which says we can do an end run around that constitutional principle
{ is not persuasive. My point is just that censoring speech is rarely a \lesser"
139See 44 Liquormart at 1511; see also Posadas, supra, n.105, at 351 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
140See supra nn. 63 - 64 and accompanying text.
57infringement because it means debate on the issues of the day is stied.
Amy: Or we can put it really simply like this: The Constitution ex-
presses a preference for free ow of information. It doesn't express nearly as
strong a preference { if it expresses one at all { for freedom to gamble or smoke
or even to be able to buy healthful food.
Shady: Alright. I think you guys are going o on a little too much of
a tangent on Posadas. Pam's right to say she has some legitimate arguments,
but Alex has some convincing ones, too, and a seemingly unanimous Supreme
Court is on his side, so why don't we just assume that the Posadas logic is no
longer good law and move on?
Jon: That would be ne with me, but I'm still a little shaky on where we
stand with the Central Hudson test today. You guys were saying that Stevens
only had a plurality for \enhanced" Central Hudson scrutiny. What did the rest
of the Court think?
Bob: Well, Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Souter, and Breyer
wrote a short opinion simply applying the Central Hudson test { presumably
without modication { to the Rhode Island law. Deciding the case on the fourth
prong of the test, Justice O'Connor had no trouble determining that Rhode Is-
land's ban on price advertising was more extensive than necessary since there
was no \reasonable t" between its means and its ends.141
Jon: So where does that leave us? It seems as if Central Hudson is
still the test, but that we just don't know how strictly to apply its prongs {
141See 44 Liquormart at 1521 - 22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
58particularly the last two, right?
Amy: And it seems pretty clear that the rst prong is as strong as ever,
since not even Justice Thomas was willing to say misleading speech, or speech
about illegal activity, gets any protection.
Roger: And isn't that what's really relevant here { I mean in our two
hypos?
Joe: How do you gure?
Roger: Well, in both our examples, the FDA merely needs to make the
claim that it's regulating misleading speech, or speech advocating illegal activity
and the First Amendment simply is not a bar to their regulations.
Bob: And that's exactly what the FDA has tried to do, in both cases.
If you look, for example at the statement FDA put in the Federal Register when
it announced the nal rule on disease-specic health claims,142 one of their main
arguments for why the regulation doesn't violate the First Amendment { besides
the obvious, if unavailing claim that Congress directed them to regulate { 143 is
that because health claims have been found, in the past, to often be misleading,
Congress reasonably labeled such claims \inherently misleading" and therefore
that they are not protected by the First Amendment.144
Shady: Now you see why I was pushing you guys with the similar ar-
14258 Fed. Reg. 2478 (January 6, 1993).
143See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526; see also 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2396 (January 6, 1993)
(making a similar claim relating to nutrient content claims regulations); Noah and Noah,
\Liberating Commercial Speech," supra n. at 89 (Although the FDA apparently took
comfort in the fact that Congress specically directed it to promulgate many of these new
rules, this cannot insulate the regulations, or for that matter, the statute itself from searching
judicial scrutiny.").
144See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526 (January 6, 1993).
59gument regarding FLSA II.145
Amy: Yeah, but how can Congress categorically label a type of speech
\inherently misleading?" That's just utterly unfair to the truly honest food-
makers out there who would never use misleading claims, but who wish to
communicate valuable information to their customers, which will be pertinent
to those customers' health { even if it the food-maker does simultaneously have
a prot-motive in making the claim. At least as applied to that type of manu-
facturer, I would say a blanket speech ban with required pre-approval for any
speech is blatantly unconstitutional.
Bob: But the Supreme Court has said that when speech \is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject
to abuse," regulation may be appropriate.146
Amy: Yes, I know. And the FDA even pointed to that language exactly
in trying to justify the health claims restrictions.147 But the Supreme Court,
even in the R.M.J. case you're citing, was not willing to say that speech which
is inherently misleading to that extent { that is, speech which has the poten-
tial to mislead and which past experience has shown often is misleading { is
entirely undeserving of First Amendment protection.148 And that's what the
FDA missed entirely.
Bob: So you're saying that speech of this inherent-potential-to-mislead
145See supra, text accompanying nn. 13 - 18.
146In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
147See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526.
148See In Re R.M.J. at 203 (holding restrictions of the type before the Court in that case {
which restricted advertising by attorneys and which the Court found to be of the type past
experience had shown carried a serious potential to mislead { could nonetheless be \no broader
than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.").
60type still has to get Central Hudson scrutiny?
Amy: I'm not sure the Court has said as much, and the language in
the Stevens primary opinion in 44 Liquormart only indicates categorically that
speech which is about unlawful activity or is misleading doesn't get First Amend-
ment protection. That sort of leaves open what happens to speech that has only
\inherent-potential-to-mislead," even where past experience has shown that that
potential often is realized. But I think First Amendment principles require that
such speech get not only Central Hudson scrutiny, but the more searching Cen-
tral Hudson scrutiny of the type Justice Stevens said restrictions on speech
directed at keeping people in the dark for their own good gets.
Alex: Well if that's the case, doesn't that seal the tobacco case, too?
Bob: How so?
Alex: Well, isn't it really the same case, but on the \unlawful" rather
than the \misleading" half of the Central Hudson rst prong?
Amy: I think you're right. The tobacco industry wants to argue that
its regulations only restrict speech exhorting the observer of the speech to en-
gage in unlawful activity { that is, ads which try to get kids to smoke, when
smoking is already illegal for those under 18 in all fty states, and is now a
federal oense as well.
Alex: But, just as not all health claims actually are misleading,
not every cigarette ad concerns unlawful activity. And in fact, one might even
argue that every cigarette ad is simultaneously directed at some lawful and some
unlawful activity. So the question becomes how FDA can possibly regulate such
61speech, when it always has two goals { one legal and one illegal. Does the First
Amendment apply or not?
Jon: I think you're on the right track, Alex, and I denitely agree
with you and Amy about the parallels between the two sets of regs we're talk-
ing about, but I think the Supreme Court has already answered your question
about what to do when speech restrictions which are meant to protect minors
have a simultaneous eect on adults. The Court has stated on numerous occa-
sions that the First Amendment will not allow the government to \reduce the
adult population... to... only what is t for children."149 This was the holding,
for example, of the 1989 phone sex case. The Court determined that restricting
\adult" telephone services \has the invalid eect of limiting the content of adult
telephone conversations to what is suitable for children."150 These cigarette re-
strictions do the same thing. Adults never get the benets of the color ads, or
ads with sound, or sports sponsorships { whatever those benets are, which the
First Amendment directs is not for government to decide.151
Alex: Well I'm inclined to agree with you, but that notion doesn't re-
ally add anything to \enhanced" Central Hudson scrutiny. FDA just asserts
a substantial interest in keeping information relating to an unlawful activity
149Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
150Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989). See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (applying this logic in rejecting a ban on unsolicited
mailing of contraceptives); Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (applying
same notion to defendant's claim that prosecution for exhibiting an allegedly obscene lm
violated the First Amendment); cf. FCC v. Pacica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750, n. 28
(1978) (upholding FCC's order ning radio station for obscene broadcast, in part because
the order did not have the eect of reducing the adult population to what is t for children,
because the same recording was readily available elsewhere).
151See Virginia Board, supra, n.89.
62(smoking by kids) away from those who have the potential to engage in that
activity (kids). Then the court merely has to look very closely at whether these
particular regulations directly advance that end and whether there is a reason-
able t between means and ends.
Bob: That all would make sense, but it's not really how the Central
Hudson test, as currently articulated works. You've really skipped over prong
one { or at least made the assumption that speech must be 100% misleading or
100% about unlawful activity in order to get tripped up by it, which the Court
has never really said.
Alex: Fair enough. But I'm ready to advocate that they should say it.
Amy: And I'm ready to go one step further. The problem with prong
one, at least as regards misleading speech, is that it will always be impossible
to label speech misleading ex ante. Any time you categorize speech { any time
you say: \All speech of X type has the inherent potential to mislead and is
therefore banned," you're bound to have banned some speech which, if allowed,
would have turned out not to be misleading.
Pam: But in this case, the FDA has laid out a fair denition of the type
of speech that is and is not misleading. They've said { taking a denition which
actually comes originally from Congress { that any health claim not supported
by \signicant scientic agreement" is inherently misleading.
Jon: And you want the FDA { or Congress { dening \truth" for us in
an area in which we are often unlikely to nd any objectively veriable \truth"?
Think of the consequences of that. What will FDA { or the FTC { be regulating
63next in the name of its being \misleading." Have you ever seen an advertisement
that doesn't mislead, if you construe that term broadly. Budweiser leads you to
believe drinking beer will make you attract beautiful women. Revlon leads you
to believe you can look like Cindy Crawford if you wear their make-up. I could
go on and on. The same holds for advertising which has only the potential to
promote unlawful activity.152Pam: Maybe in the cases of food labeling
and smoking, it's just too dangerous to the public health to have it any other
way.
Shady: Aha! Now we're getting back to where I started this. Even if
some of you are right, and FDA can't get out from First Amendment scrutiny
under Central Hudson's rst prong, and even if the very fact that this is com-
mercial speech is not enough to make a dierence { that is, if we accept that
commercial/non-commercial is a distinction without a dierence, might the mere
substantiality of the government interest justify these regulations, as it can with
any constitutional infringement?
Amy: But now we're back where we started from with the Hussein/FLSA
II example. I thought we demonstrated pretty clearly why even that danger
didn't justify the FLSA II restrictions { which were, after all, patterned after
the tobacco and health claims regs. So if the misleading nature or unlawful
subject matter of the speech doesn't make a dierence, and the fact that it's
152See American Advertising Federation, \FDA Talking Points," on le with author:
Censorship begins, but does not end, with tobacco. The FDA could consider censoring
the truthful advertising for any and all food products, cosmetics, alcoholic beverages, coee,
sugar, fats, cholesterol, salt, medicines and medical devises. Activists will urge other agencies
to censor advertising for such legal products and services as rearms, motor vehicles, abor-
tion services, violent or sexually explicit movies, television programs, books and any other
unpopular product or service.
64commercial doesn't make a dierence, then there's just no dierence, and these
regs fall with FLSA II.
Pam: Of course, those are very big \Ifs," Amy.
Joe: And you forgot a third one. Your argument is valid only \if" the
threat posed by Tommy Hussein's candidacy is equally as serious or more se-
rious than the threats posed by teenage smoking and unsubstantiated health
claims.
Amy: True, but do you really want to argue about that?
Joe: I only point it out because the FDA might want to make that
argument, judging from their statements in the Federal Register when they
announced the nal health claims rules.153 There, the FDA pointed to the rec-
ognized strong government interest in regulation of the food supply and likened
that interest to the government's interest in regulating other types of economic
activity { securities exchanges and the practice of law provide two good exam-
ples. The notion they appeal to is that \The Government `does not lose its
power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever
speech is a component of that activity."154 And, they add, \Indeed, regula-
tion of food labeling would be impossible if the government could not restrict
speech."155
Amy: Yeah, and they even note that the FDA can seize books, as long
as they're in the health food store, where they can be construed as \labeling"
153See 58 Fed. Reg. 2478.
154Id. at 2525, quoting Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
155Id.
65the products in the store, and not in the library.156 So what they're really
saying { and what you're saying, Joe { is that FDA is above the Constitution
{ that their whole mission { keeping America's food, drug, cosmetic, and med-
ical device supply safe, healthy, and eective { is so important, that the First
Amendment just falls by the wayside.
Joe: You can look at it that way if you want. And you could say the
same about the FTC. Or the SEC, for that matter, and the courts seem to have
bought it.157
Mark: But there's got to be more to it than that, too. It really does
have to have something to do with the fact that whatever speech is censored by
the regulation of the sorts of economic activity we're talking about { lawyering,
selling securities, selling food, etc.{ is regulation of commercial speech. The
problem comes in because we all recognize the very legitimate government in-
terest in regulating these economic activities, where in reality, speech { albeit
commercial speech { is an integral part of those activities. So my point, I guess,
is that recognizing government power to regulate the economic activity neces-
sarily means recognizing government power to regulate the speech which is such
an integral part of that economic activity. All we have to do { and this is what
Justice Stevens was getting at in 44 Liquormart { is to make sure that the
government really is only regulating speech as part of its need to regulate the
156See Id., citing U.S. v. 8 Cartons, Containing Plantation The Original... Molasses, 103 F.
Supp. 626, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) and U.S. v. Article of Drug, 32 F.R.D. 32 (S.D. Ill. 1963).
157See Ohralik, supra, n.154 (upholding restrictions on lawyer's solicitation of business);
SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute, 851 F.2d 365, 373 (\If speech employed directly
or indirectly to sell securities were totally protected, any regulation of the securities market
would be infeasible { and that result has long since been rejected.").
66economic activity generally, and not for some other motive. If the regulation
meets that requirement, it's OK.
Joe: And then would you even say you can look at the Central Hudson
test as a way of making sure the only thing really being regulated is the eco-
nomic activity, and the speech incident to it?
Mark: Well, I'm not sure the Central Hudson test can actually be read
to say all that, but I do think the Court might be going in this direction, judg-
ing from 44 Liquormart and most of the Court's hostility to regulation { even
of commercial speech { when the regulation is meant to keep information from
people to get them to behave the way the government (paternalistically) prefers
{ as opposed to being merely a \consumer protection" measure.158
Jon: Wait. So if I read you guys right, you're now saying that the
distinction here does turn on the fact that the speech being regulated is com-
mercial?
Mark: Well, that's part of it, I think. But I think what I'm saying is a
little more strict than the commercial/non-commercial distinction. I'm saying
only some types of regulation of some types of commercial speech gets lesser
scrutiny than does other speech. Yes, the speech must be commercial, but that's
really because to be regulable, the speech must be incident to otherwise regula-
ble commercial activity. And when the government does regulate that speech,
it must be doing it for the more general consumer protection purposes for which
government { particularly the agencies we're talking about (FTC, SEC, FTC,
158See 44 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J.)
67FDA, the state bar association...) { exist, and not for some ulterior motive, like
reducing alcohol consumption, as in 44 Liquormart or the Coors case,159 or like
discouraging gambling, as in Posadas.
Joe: Or like discouraging smoking?
Mark: Yeah. I think the point is that regulations like the tobacco
regs just don't t into the little exception I'm really saying needs to be carved
out here. That doesn't mean I'm yet 100% convinced that the tobacco regs are
unconstitutional, only that they don't t into my exception.
Joe: And the health claims?
Mark: Well that's trickier. It does seem as if FDA's doing that with
no ulterior motive and purely in the interest of consumer protection. So maybe
they're right that the fact that they have to regulate speech as part of their
regulation of the economic activity of food-selling shouldn't doom the endeavor.
Joe: But... ?
Mark: But, it still doesn't seem fair for them to be stiing messages the
public has an interest in hearing...
Jon: ... or for the government to be determining \truth" with regard to
scientically uncertain issues. I mean it really is dierent from the government
regulating objectively false advertising or fraudulent securities oerings.
Amy: I think I agree with you there Jon, and you know, I think I may
reluctantly be coming around to see what you guys are getting at, more gener-
159Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995) (invalidating federal law forbidding
disclosure of alcohol content in the labeling of beer, supposedly for the government purpose
of discouraging `strength wars' among brewers).
68ally. I'm not fully sure I buy it, but I'm willing to say I'll think about it. It's
at least intriguing.
Alex: But it still doesn't denitively solve our cases as far as I'm con-
cerned. I mean, even if we buy your exception, we still have to make sure we're
not unnecessarily chilling speech. Nothing can justify that { assuming we em-
phasize the \unnecessarily" part.
Roger: So you're saying we still need to do the Central Hudson analysis,
in any event?
Alex: Yea, because I think it's possible that even if the health claims
regulations could conceivably be justied on the type of logic Mark was talking
about, they might still be \overbroad".
Amy: I sure hope we can conclude that, because even if I buy Mark's
point, this whole prior restraint thing bothers me a lot.
Mark: Well, unfortunately, I'm not sure it will be so easy to show how
these regs fail the Central Hudson test. The government interest is surely sub-
stantial, as I think we've more or less agreed.
Joe: You mean just the interest in making sure consumers aren't de-
ceived, or confused?
Mark: Yeah, or to make it concrete, the interest in protecting health
by ensuring that the public is not eating too much or too little of a certain
substance, based upon false information.
Bob: And there's also an articulable government interest that actually
comes right out of the First Amendment. As FDA said in its justication for
69the regulation, there's a government interest in ensuring that consumers obtain
information necessary to make intelligent decisions { and in ensuring that this
information is truthful and not misleading.160
Amy: Alright. Even I'll agree that there is a substantial government
interest in protecting health. But as to Bob's point, I think it's disingenuous, or
at least oddly ironic for the government to justify speech restrictions by point-
ing to the First Amendment. On that logic, President Gore could say FLSA II
serves a substantial government interest as well: the First Amendment interest
in ensuring that voters receive truthful information about candidates. That
would seem ne, but it's horribly dangerous, when the President { or his Com-
mittee { is deciding what information is truthful. Do we trust that Gore didn't
make up the whole Saddam's son thing? I certainly don't see a good reason to
trust the overworked FDA to decide { at least in a timely manner { whether a
claim { which is bound to be laden with scientic and statistical uncertainty {
is \true".161
Mark: I guess I agree with you, Amy, but not much has to turn on
your point if we all agree there is at least a substantial interest in protecting
health. Now, as for the second { or ocially the third { Central Hudson prong
{
Pam: Wait a minute. Before we get to that, what about just the gov-
ernment interest in making sure that both sides of any debatable issue get out
160See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526.
161cf. Noah and Noah, \Liberating Commercial Speech," supra n.102, at 96 (\The Agency
itself has acknowledged that `consumers will lose valuable information' if truthful health claims
are withheld from the public.")
70there. I mean, doesn't the government have an interest in regulating health
claims on labels just because the food manufacturer has a monopoly on that
forum. If the manufacturer could say whatever it wants, there would be no way
for the person consuming the food to evaluate an alternative side of the story.
I'm not even talking here about manufacturers making intentionally false or
misleading claims. I'm just talking about them making claims on which there is
scientic uncertainty. \Some scientists have found...", \Consuming this product
may help prevent...", etc. If there are contrary studies, the manufacturer won't
tell the consumer about them, but the consumer will have no other realistic and
convenient way to hear about them. So doesn't the government have an interest
in making sure one side of a story on issues so relevant to everyone's daily life
isn't sitting out there?
Alex: That sounds logical enough, but that's exactly what we were talk-
ing about with Tommy Hussein, and you sound like President Gore. But we
determined, looking at Buckley v. Valeo,162 that the government can't level
the playing eld by simply silencing the one side of the story that would other-
wise get out there. They have to nd another way to do that, even if it means
spending lots of government money on counterspeech.163 Or maybe an equal
time requirement would be OK.164 But the sort of interest you're articulating
could never justify censorship.
Pam: Well, but you've just done the whole Central Hudson analysis
there and found it fails prong four. That doesn't mean I didn't articulate a
162424 U.S. 1 (1976).
163See supra, text accompanying nn. 16 - 18.
164See supra nn. 20 - 22 and accompanying text.
71legitimate enough government interest to get past Central Hudson's prong two.
Alex: Fair enough, but I'm just saying Buckley has already instructed
us that if you assert that sort of government interest, the First Amendment will
never allow you to serve it by censorship.
Pam: But Buckley involved political speech.
Alex: True, and that may make a dierence, but I just doubt it
should. It just seems so obvious that even under Central Hudson { not even the
enhanced version from 44 Liquormart { censorship will never be a reasonable
way of leveling the playing eld on which speech takes place.
Mark: Alright, I think you guys have pretty much settled that one, or
at least you know what the issues are. So as I was saying, regarding the third
Central Hudson prong, there can be no doubt that a blanket ban on health
claims not previously approved by FDA directly advances the government in-
terest in preventing misleading health claims and thereby protecting the public
health.
Amy: But I think there can be a doubt. And that's why I think my
earlier point about what the government interest is is relevant.165 If the govern-
ment interest is recast as an interest in making sure the American public gets
the most accurate information about the disease-preventing and disease-causing
aspects of the various elements of the food supply, I don't think we have any
evidence that the FDA's methods advance that interest. Perfectly valid claims
165See supra, text accompanying n.161.
72{ or at least claims which are, on the basis of currently available evidence, more
likely than not to be true { are going un-made. That has to be true. It seems ob-
vious even from looking at the sheer paucity of claims the FDA has allowed.166
So I would argue that the current system may be causing more public deception
{ in the form of omissions of valid information { than there would be if the FDA
did not censor un-approved claims.
Mark: But you can't be sure that's going to be empirically true.
Amy: Maybe not, so that's why I would say there's only one way to
nd out { the way the Constitution already predetermined is the best way to
get at truth: free and open public debate.
Roger: So now we're getting into prong four. You're really questioning
whether this is the best way to go about achieving the government's goals, even
recast as you articulated them.
Bob: Maybe they are, but remember that that's not really what the
fourth prong inquiry is.
Pam: Well, but does anybody know what that inquiry is?
Mark: Well, we do have some good evidence of what at least one court
dealing with this exact situation thought it is. In 1995, a Utah district court
actually ruled on the constitutionality of the FDA health claims regulations
regarding diet supplements, which are really not signicantly dierent for our
purposes from the regulations covering health claims about food products.167
The court held that the regs passed the Central Hudson test easily, and its de-
166See supra, text accompanying nn. 55 - 56.
167See National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 893 F.Supp. 1512 (D. Utah 1995).
73scription of the fourth prong provides a good summary. The court took its lead
from the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Board of Trustees of State University
of New York v. Fox,168 and noted that \it is only required that a \reasonable t"
be achieved between the end sought and the means used."169 Quoting further
from Fox, the court noted, \What our decisions require is a \`t' between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends," {a t that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is `in proportion to the interest served';
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it
in other contexts... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.
Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what
manner of regulation may best be employed." 170 With those parameters laid
out, the court had no diculty nding the health claims regs meet the test.171
Amy: But that was a year and a half ago. A major commercial speech
decision has intervened.
Mark: True, and that's why where the fourth prong is is a little up
in the air. The Stevens opinion did seem to reject such a lenient test, pretty
clearly, especially when it disparaged Posadas so explicitly, since that case really
epitomized the lenient enforcement the Court had previously given the fourth
prong.172 And Thomas certainly dislikes Central Hudson altogether.173 But, at
168492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
169See National Council for Improved Health 893 F.Supp at 1520.
170492 U.S. at 478.
171See National Council for Improved Health 893 F.Supp at 1520.
172See supra nn. 134 - 137 and accompanying text.
173See supra n.127 and accompanying text.
74least four justices didn't really express any interest in modifying the test much,
174 and more importantly, we have to remember the distinctions we've already
talked about between cases which get the \enhanced" Central Hudson scrutiny
and those that don't. It may be that to the extent the health claims regs get any
sort of Central Hudson scrutiny, it may still be of the more lenient Posadas/Fox
type the Utah judge applied. And that, as the Utah judge has already told us,
it would clearly pass.
Shady: OK. I think you now all see what I meant when I kept saying
the First Amendment issues are much more complicated than they appeared at
rst blush. And once again, we've been unable to reach any clear consensus
of what to do, but we at least understand most of the issues. And I think,
despite the similarities to FLSA II, most of you are willing to concede that it
really may make some sense to distinguish the health claims regs from FLSA
II. At the same time, I hope it's become clear that it really does take some
work to distinguish the cases. If you debunk the commercial/non-commercial
speech distinction, as I think you may have eectively done, and if you can't
prove that the threat posed by misbranding is worse than the threat posed by
Tommy Hussein (which is certainly hard to do), the cases may still be very
similar. Courts will have to do a lot to uphold the health claims regs yet keep
on the books all the holdings you guys were citing in discussing FLSA II. Now,
how does all this apply to cigarettes?
Alex: Well I think we decided a few minutes ago that there really is no
174See supra n.141 and accompanying text.
75way to apply anything but Justice Stevens' \enhanced" Central Hudson scrutiny
to the tobacco regs, since cigarette ads are always at least partially promoting
lawful activity, and because of the Court's restrictions on government regulation
which reduces the adult population to what is t for children.175
Amy: So basically, we have to look very closely at the regs to determine
whether they directly advance, \to a material degree," the government's clearly
substantial interest in reducing teen-age smoking, and whether there is...
Bob: Whether there is what? See, that's the problem. Justice Stevens
never really dened how to apply the fourth prong in enhanced-Central-Hudson-
type situations. He said Posadas didn't make sense, and that it wasn't \up to
the legislature".176 And there is some language to the eect that restrictions
must be \no more extensive than necessary,"177 but Stevens also says Rhode
Island \failed to establish a `reasonable t' between its abridgement of speech
and its temperance goal."178
Roger: And that's exactly what the cigarette industry and the FDA
are ghting about down in North Carolina.179 The plaintis want to say that
44 Liquormart and other recent commercial speech cases mean that the fourth
prong test is relatively strict, and even that it means that when alternatives
which do not require speech restrictions are available, any speech restriction
is unconstitutional.180 The FDA, meanwhile, emphasizes that the Court \has
175See supra nn. 149 - 51 and accompanying text.
17644 Liquormart, 116 S.Ct. at 1510 - 11.
177Id. at 1510.
178Id.
179See briefs led in Coyne Beahm, supra n.62.
180See Plainti's Third Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment in Coyne
Beahm, supra n.62, at 14 - 18
76never retreated from Fox's rm rejection of a `least restrictive means' test,"181
and that ve justices in 44 Liquormart did decline to alter the Central Hudson
test in any signicant way.182
Amy: Well, the FDA may ocially be right, and it may even be too
drastic to say that there's now this new per se rule about not restricting speech
when non-speech alternatives are available, but it just seems so obvious to me
that there are so many eective and much less restrictive means of achieving
the legitimate and substantial government interests asserted here. Given that
you can't make head or tail of what the Supreme Court has actually said {
and the Coyne Beahm parties' diametrically opposed views, neither of which
is non-sensical, are evidence of that { given that that's the case, I would just
fall back on the intuitive sense of what the First Amendment's supposed to be
doing. Just as with FLSA II, I would say, at least for this case, the restrictions
are so invasive that the First Amendment won't allow it.
Pam: But are there really alternatives which would be eective?
Amy: Well, rst of all, I'm not even convinced that the regulations as
they currently exist would be eective in curbing teen-age smoking signicantly.
In fact, we skipped over the third prong inquiry, which is exactly what that ques-
tion gets at.
Bob: But isn't that just an empirical question? We just don't know, in
the abstract, whether they work or not. We'd need to do all kinds of scientic,
181Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plainti's Motion for Summary Judgment in Coyne
Beahm, supra n.62, at 116.
182See id. at 102. (noting that neither the opinion of Justice O'Connor, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Souter joined, nor the separate opinion of Justice
Scalia expressed interest in departing from the Central Hudson test as currently formulated.)
77psychological studies about the eects of advertising, and about whether social
realities may be much more of a cause of teen smoking than advertising.183 And
that's why the Coyne Beahm plaintis have only sought summary judgment on
the fourth prong ground and have agreed that a trial would be necessary if the
court thought the constitutionality would turn on the prong three analysis.184
So who are we to sit here in the abstract and judge whether the regulations will
work?
Amy: You're right, but what if it does work? If it eectively prevents
teen smoking, that's one thing, but what if it turns out it also prevents adult
smoking? Is that good? Not speaking legally, of course it is { at least I certainly
think so { but from a legal point of view, it would just serve to show that the
government has succeeded, via speech restriction, in achieving one of its pater-
nalistic goals { which is just what 44 Liquormart (or Stevens' opinion at any
rate) made clear would be unacceptable.
Alex: So then we would have shown that the law was not narrowly tai-
lored enough to serve the government's legitimate interest in deterring unlawful
activity, which brings us back to prong four.
Amy: OK. You're right. So the essential question is Pam's: Are there
less restrictive alternative means by which the government can achieve its goal
of curbing teenage smoking without restricting speech regarding lawful activity
{ without overly restricting advertising directed at adults and thereby reducing
183Cf. Maria J. Johnson, \Taking Advantage of Joe Camel's and Marlboro Man's Rights Is
UnKool and Merits Constitutional Protection: Penn Advertising, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995)," 21 U. Dayton L. Rev. 489, 489 - 90 (1996) (arguing that social
pressures have a more serious impact on teen smoking than advertising).
184See Plainti's Third Brief, supra n.180, at 4 n.3
78them to children?
Pam: Well? Are there?
Amy: I would say there certainly are. And I would make the same ar-
guments I made about FLSA II.185
Mark: But before you even get to those, here there's an even less con-
troversial way to do it. Just regulate the conduct { teen smoking { extensively.
That's what many of the regulations which I don't have a problem with do, like
the federal minimum age, the requirement of checking IDs, the vending machine
ban, etc.186 And the Coyne Beahm plaintis have proposed a few others in their
brief, including prohibiting possession and use of tobacco by minors, requiring
licensing for tobacco vendors, establishing an extensive enforcement mechanism,
and prosecuting violators.187
Pam: But what happens when FDA argues that even all that is not
enough, since if there's demand, kids will always nd a way to smoke, and thus
that to really accomplish its goal, FDA has to cut o demand by limiting smok-
ing's appeal?
Alex: Then we at least fall back on Amy's less restrictive speech-related
alternatives.
Amy: Yeah, so as I was saying, as with FLSA II, government counter-
speech, or at least government-subsidized counterspeech might be enough. Or,
if necessary, an equal time requirement of some sort would probably work.188
185See supra, text accompanying nn. 18 - 23 (Amy's arguments).
186See supra nn. 66 - 71 and accompanying text.
187See Plainti's Third Brief, supra n.180, at 19.
188See generally, Helen McGee Konrad, \Eliminating Distinctions Between Commercial and
Political Speech: Replacing Regulation with Government Counterspeech," 47 Wash. & Lee
79And, if all else fails, I would at least prefer compelled counterspeech to the
outright bans and severe censorships the current regulations impose. Of course,
I understand that that's very possibly unconstitutional under the compelled
speech doctrine of Wooley v. Maynard { which, I should note, the Supreme
Court could possibly rearm and extend to the realm of commercial speech
this term in the peach advertising case189 { but I still think it would be better
than what the current regs do.
Pam: And what if the FDA says the government just doesn't have the
resources to pursue any of those options?
Amy: Again, like I said with regard to FLSA II, if the government is
not willing to step up to the plate in a constitutional fashion, then its goal can't
be that pressing, and it should be forced to forego regulation altogether.190
Pam: Well, but you could be saying that in all sorts of places. I
mean, doesn't that make the Constitution into too much of a barrier to eective
government. After all, it's not a suicide pact.
Amy: True, but now we're back to the same old argument. At some
point we'll have to balance when the Constitution has to give way to greater
interests { be they prevention of the publication of sailing dates of ships, the
L. Rev. 1129 (1990);
189Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S.Ct. 1875 (1996) (holding California's mandatory assessment on peach and nectarine growers
to pay for generic advertising program violated First Amendment); cf. Noah and Noah,
\Nicotine Withdrawal," supra n.63 at 60 - 62 (determining that FDA proposal to require that
$150 million of tobacco industry money be spent annually on anti-smoking messages posed
serious First Amendment problems); see also supra, n.19 and accompanying text.
190See supra, text accompanying nn. 18 - 19 (discussing argument that government should
have to bear the costs of regulating in a constitutionally inoensive manner).
80publication of top-secret national security les, the election of an Iraqi dictator's
son, or dissemination of false claims about the quasi-medicinal values of food. I
just don't think teen smoking has yet become such a huge problem that we're
ready to say the interest in preventing it trumps the Constitution, especially
when there are so many less constitutionally oensive, if expensive, alternatives
out there. We just don't want to set an awful precedent for the government to
be able to say casually that it's too expensive to follow the Constitution.
Pam: But overly strong resolutions of these cases would set the equally
troublesome precedent that the Constitution will prevent eective government.
Shady: And therein lies the dilemma.
81